Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States by Powell, Catherine
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2001 
Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation 
of Human Rights Law in the United States 
Catherine Powell 
Georgetown University, cp443@law.georgetown.edu 
Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-115 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1008 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130128 
 
150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 245-295 (2001) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the State and 
Local Government Law Commons 
DIALOGIC FEDERALISM: CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITIES 
FOR INCORPORATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
CATHERINE POWELL' 
Where, after all, do universal rights begin? In small places, close to 
home-so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of 
the world.... Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little 
meaning anywhere. Without concerned citizen action to uphold them 
close to home, we shall look in vain for progress in the larger world. 
-Eleanor Roosevelt 
While the U.S. Constitution assigns the power to make and adopt 
treaties to the federal government, several state and local govern- 
ments have "adopted" human rights treaties and other international 
norms, often in response to constituent pressures that are more effec- 
tively mobilized at the subnational level.2 For example, in the absence 
of federal ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
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Woodrow Wilson School in Public and International Affairs (1991); J.D., Yale Law 
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Eleanor Roosevelt, Address at a United Nations Ceremony in New York (Mar. 
27, 1958), in Peter Meyer, The International Bill of Human Rights: A Brief History, at 
http://paulwilliams.com/globalrights/history.html (citation omitted). 
2 I have put "adopted" in quotes because state and local governments cannot 
technically adopt treaties, although they can incorporate international human rights 
standards into state and local law simply by enacting legislation reflecting these norms. 
While the Constitution provides that the President "shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur," U.S. CONST. art. II, ? 2, cl. 2, it specifically prohibits state govern- 
ments from making treaties without the consent of Congress, id. at art. I, ? 10, cl. 3. 
For the purposes of this Article, I capitalize "States" to refer to nation-states in the in- 
ternational law sense, and de-capitalize "states" to refer to the 50 states of the United 
States. 
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Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) , San Francisco 
has incorporated "principles of CEDAW" into binding local law.4 In 
the death penalty context, where the federal government has not yet 
opted to ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Second Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR),' aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, a handful of 
cities have urged their states, and in some cases the federal govern- 
ment, to support a moratorium, relying on the United Nations Com- 
mission on Human Rights' call for such a moratorium. 6 
What are the constitutional implications of this and other moves 
to bypass the federal government in incorporating and enforcing in- 
ternational human rights? Discussions about the allocation of author- 
ity between federal and subfederal systems in the implementation of 
international human rights law typically proceed by staking out one of 
two initial positions.7 At one end of the spectrum, a traditional consti- 
tutional theory takes a restrictive view of state and local authority, en- 
visioning hierarchical imposition of federally implemented interna- 
tional law norms through the federal treaty power8 and determination 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
openedfor signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
See SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 12K (2001) (providing the 
local San Francisco law entitled "Local Implementation of the United Nations Conven- 
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)"), 
available at http://www.amlegal.com/sanfranadmin/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main- 
j.htm&2.0. 
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 54th 
Sess., Annex, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/44/824 (1989), reprinted in1989 U.N.Y.B. 484. For 
Congressional discussion on the rejection of the Second Optional Protocol, see U.S. 
Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. 8068, 8071 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. RUDs to the 
ICCPR]. For the treaty itself, see the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23, 999 U.N.T.S. 172, 
173 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
For discussion, see infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text. 
I have adapted discussion of the following two positions from a framework de- 
veloped by Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff in the context of habeas cor- 
pus law to fit the international human rights law context. See Robert M. Cover & T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 
1035, 1047 (1997) (making a similar observation in the context of habeas corpus law, 
in which two paradigms were developed and defended: "a model of hierarchical im- 
position of federally determined values; and a model of fragmentation, justifying value 
choices by the states"). I am indebted to Judith Resnik for bringing this article to my 
attention. 
The Supreme Court has opined, "No doubt the great body of private relations 
usually fall within the control of [a] state, but a treaty may override its power." Mis- 
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of customary international law} by federal courts.'0 At the other end of 
the spectrum, a revisionist theory assumes greater fragmentation and 
authority reserved to the states based on federalism and separation of 
powers limits on federal authority." "These divergent images capture 
souri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (holding that the treaty power authorizes 
Congress to legislate under the Necessary and Proper Clause in areas beyond those 
specifically conferred in Article 1, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution and that the 
treaty power is not subject to most Tenth Amendment limitations); see also Martin S. 
Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1280 (1999) (arguing that the "federal foreign affairs authority 
does and should trump the prohibition against the national government enlisting state 
officials"); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of 
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1314 (2000) ("[T]he 
nationalist conception of the treaty power... finds its ultimate justification in the 
Founders' decision to lodge the whole of the foreign affairs powers exclusively in the 
national government."). 
"Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of 
[s]tates followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES ? 102 (1986). 
See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International 
Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 529 (1997) ("[F]or 
nearly twenty ears, the federal government ... has spoken with one voice on the status 
of [customary international law (CIL)] in U.S. law: [u] niversally-recognized human 
rights are judicially-cognizable f deral aw."); Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in 
the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1569 (1984) ("[T]he law of nations, which is 
the responsibility ofthe U.S. nation, should be seen as incorporated in our national 
jurisprudence as national (federal) law."); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law 
Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1824 (1998) (" U] udicial determinations of 
international law-including international human rights law-are matters of federal 
law."); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Re- 
sponse to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 376-77 (1997) ("In- 
corporation at the federal level respects the national character of foreign relations: 
the [s] tates are not entitled to adopt individual approaches to international law."); 
Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After 
Erie, 66 FORDIIAM L. REV. 393, 397 (1997) (arguing that "the determination of the 
content of customary international law and of whether or not it applies in a given 
situation is a federal question, which triggers federal court jurisdiction and on which 
federal court decisions are binding on the states"). 
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of In- 
ternational Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 349 (1997) [hereinafter 
Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy] (contending, based on the famous proclama- 
tion in E'rie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), that "[t] here is no federal 
general common law," and that determinations of CIL are questions of state law which 
"federal courts should not apply. . . as federal aw without some authorization to do so 
by the federal political branches"); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary 
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 816, 816-21 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern 
Position] (characterizing the traditional approach-which assumes CIL is a type of 
federal common law-as a "modern position" that is inconsistent with federalism; 
courts should not apply CIL as federal law unless authorized to do so by the federal 
political branches); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 
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different moments of political promise and despair, at times focused 
on the immense power of the national project, and other times ap- 
preciating the vitality and durability of forms of governance that, 
without . . . great resources, continue to have social and political 
force."'2 
Under both models, one system-either federal or subfederal- 
has a predominant voice in deciding when and how international hu- 
man rights law is implemented. Such either/or approaches seek to 
avoid the conflict and indeterminacy created when the distribution of 
constitutional uthority isuncertain.' At the traditional/hierarchical 
end of the spectrum, the conflict is interference with the ability of the 
nation to speak with "one voice" in foreign affairs,14 posed by "diver- 
gent and perhaps parochial state interpretations" of international 
law. ' At the revisionist/fragmentation end, the conflict, at its core, is 
VA. L. REV. 1617, 1622 (1997) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Federal Courts] (arguing that the 
federal common law of foreign relations as currently practiced by courts and 
understood by scholars lacks justification); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power 
and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 394 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty 
Power] (arguing that the unlimited power of treaty makers over states is inconsistent 
with American federalism). 
12 judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism's Options, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 465, 500 
(1996) (concluding a symposium on "Constructing a New Federalism: Jurisdictional 
Comvetition and Competence"). 
See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 1047 ("Both paradigms create a sense 
that conflict and indeterminacy are dysfunctional."). 
14 See, eg., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000) (em- 
phasizing the need for the President o speak for the nation with one voice in dealing 
with other governments); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 508 n.4 (1988) 
(finding "distinctive federal interest in ... the exterior relation of this whole nation 
with other nations and governments" (internal quotation marks and citations omit- 
ted)); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) ("'In inter- 
national relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the 
United States act through a single government with unified and adequate national 
power."' (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933))); 
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (" [T] he con- 
duct of our foreign affairs is entrusted under the Constitution to the National Gov- 
ernment, not for local probate courts of the several states."); United States v. Belmont, 
301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) ("Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, 
but is vested exclusively in the national government. And... the Executive ha[s] 
authority to speak as the sole organ of that government."). 
15 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964). The Court 
also stated that "ordering our relationships with other members of the international 
community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal aw." Id. Sabbatino relied 
on an influential article by Professor (later International Court of Justice Judge) 
Phillip C. Jessup, who argued that Justice Brandeis' famous pronouncement in Erie, 
304 U.S. at 78, that "[t]here is no federal general common law," had (in Jessup's 
words) "no direct application to international law." Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of 
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 741 
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interference with states' rights by federal courts (without authoriza- 
tion to do so by the federal political branches) and by the political 
branches (particularly Congress, when it exercises the treaty power to 
legislate in areas beyond those specifically conferred in the U.S. Con- 
stitution, Article 1, Section 8)."' While the two paradigms described 
here are idealized and oversimplify the subtlety and hybridity within 
these paradigms, in fact much of the scholarship on federalism and 
human rights law in the United States loosely tracks one or the other 
of these two models, if not always in its purest form. 
This Article argues for a third approach, premised on dialogue 
and intergovernmental relations as a way to negotiate, rather than 
avoid, conflict and indeterminacy." This approach links national and 
subnational governments in a dialogue about rights by "creat[ing] ar- 
eas of overlap in which neither system can claim total sovereignty."1 
The dialogue emerges in these areas of overlap, particularly where dif- 
ferences arise in the extent to which national and subnational gov- 
ernments incorporate human rights obligations. Conflict and inde- 
(1939). For more recent discussion of the same point, see Koh, supra note 10, at 1832, 
arguing that designating state courts as the primary interpreters of CIL "would have 
raised the specter that multiple variants of the same international law rule could pro- 
liferate among the several states." 
Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 11; Bradley & 
Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 11. 
17Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 1048 (proposing a model of federal-state 
interaction and dialogue to address conflict and indeterminacy in the context of ha- 
beas law). For discussion about the need for a new dynamic approach to federalism 
generally, see, for example, MICHAEL D. REAGAN & JOHN G. SANZONE, THE NEW 
FEDERALISM 3 (2d ed. 1981), stating: "Federalism-old style-is dead. Yet federal- 
ism-new style-is alive and well and living in the United States. Its name is intergov- 
ernmental relations." I view the third approach offered here as consistent with an 
emerging body of scholarship on federalism and human rights law located along the 
middle of the spectrum described above. This emerging body of scholarship includes, 
for example, Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2001) (arguing that we should be less categorical about alloca- 
tion of authority between national and subnational governments); and PeterJ. Spiro, 
The States and International Human Rights, 66 FoRDHAM L. REv. 567, 568-69 (1997) (ar- 
guing for direct liability for subnational entities-state and local governments-under 
international law, as well as authority for these entities to "discreetly associate with 
formal human rights regimes"). Aspects of scholarship that incline toward the tradi- 
tional end of the spectrum indicate sympathy for the hybridity captured by the middle 
of the spectrum. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 10, at 1858 (noting that a "zero-sum image 
of state-federal competition leads Bradley and Goldsmith to downplay the multiple 
channels through which international human rights norms trickle down to the states 
from the federal government"). However, the approach outlined in this Article sug- 
gests that these norms trickle up as well as down. 
h Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 1048. 
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terminacy are desired conditions, so long as mechanisms exist to 
channel and resolve these differences and ambiguities, as a means of 
clarifying and articulating international human rights domestically. 
By contrast, where one system has sovereignty to act without the con- 
sensus and support of the other, the reach of international human 
rights law lacks both depth and breadth. Under the tradi- 
tional/hierarchical model, human rights law lacks depth and con- 
creteness because the democratic deficit inherent in the formation 
and ratification of treaties1~ disables the federal government from 
gaining support for human rights at the state and local level. Under 
the revisionist/fragmentation model, human rights law lacks breadth 
and national impact in the absence of some form of national coopera- 
tion and coordination. By requiring intergovernmental cooperation 
and dialogue, the third approach offered here facilitates the difficult 
process of working out how to convert abstract international law prin- 
ciples into concrete, workable domestic laws and policies with national 
reach. 
I call this arrangement "dialogic federalism" because it is based on 
the assumption that dialogue among various levels of government is 
critical to meaningful implementation of international human rights 
law in the United States.'O It also assumes that engagement in this in- 
tergovernmental dialogue occurs hand in hand with dialogue between 
and among various international, national, and subnational actors and 
constituencies. Rather than facilitate mere transmission of the interna- 
tional, then, this approach envisions a process of translation of interna- 
tional to national.21 "Just as we know that translation from one lan- 
guage to another requires more than literalness, we must recognize 
the creativity, and therefore the uncertainty, involved in domestic in- 
terpretation [of international law.]"22 After all, while translation owes 
See infra notes 28, 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of public 
access to and engagement in the treaty-making process). 
2I am grateful to Kendall Thomas, who identified the term "dialogic federalism" 
in valuable comments he provided to me on an earlier draft of this Article. While 
Cover and Aleinikoff, supra note 7, call the conceptual framework they developed in 
the habeas context "dialectic federalism," I prefer the phrase "dialogic federalism" in 
the context I address here, to stress the central importance of dialogue in implement- 
ing international norms, the legitimacy of which is questioned prior to democratic 
consideration and adoption of these norms. 
See Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. 
INT'L L. & POL. 501, 504-05 (2000) (arguing that genuine domestic incorporation of 
international law involves more than "a conveyor belt that delivers international law to 
the people"). 
22 Id. at 506. 
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fidelity to the other's language and text (the "other" here being inter- 
national law), it also requires assertion of one's own language as well 
("one's own" being domestic law) 23 "The ideal is thus neither wholly 
international nor wholly national, but a hybrid that expressles] the 
relationship between them."24 The negotiation between international 
and domestic legal regimes, and the hybridity which results, are the 
driving forces behind translation of broad international principles 
into concrete articulation of rights reflected domestically in law and 
practice . 
The translation metaphor is central to the model of dialogue envi- 
sioned in this Article, because it captures the foreignness that many 
Americans associate with international law. As a formal matter, rati- 
fied treaties and customary international law are law of the land in the 
United States.)'" As a practical matter, however, international law is of- 
ten viewed as an alien source of law, lacking democratic legitimacy. 
This latter view is reflected in Supreme Courtjurisprudence.2' Trans- 
lation from international to domestic law through broad-based demo- 
cratic deliberation and discussion is necessary to address the demo- 
cratic deficit inherent in the ways international law is implemented in 
the United States. While particular democratic deficits characterize 
lawmaking processes in the United States generally,2 this Article ar- 
gues that the problem is aggravated in the making and implementa- 
tion of international law because of lack of transparency in the inter- 
national processes in which treaties are negotiated as well as in the 
domestic processes by which treaties are ratified by the Senate, with- 
out input from the House, unlike purely domestic legislation. By al- 
lowing incorporation of international law through multiple points of 
Id. (citing JAMES BOND WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN 
CULTURAL. AND LEGAL CRITICISM 264 (1990)). 
24 Id. 
Cf. id. (citing Homi K. Bhabha, The Commitment to Theory, NEW FORMATIONS, 
Summer 1988, at 5, 22 (stating "that it is the 'inter'-the cutting edge of translation 
and negotiation" that opens a space in which "we will find those words with which we 
can speak of Ourselves and Others")). 
2For discussion see inra notes 49-50, 52 and accompanying text. 
2 For discussion see infra notes 51, 53 and accompanying text. 
28 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC 
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 12 (1997) ("[T]he message [of public choice litera- 
ture] is ... about why political markets cannot work to satisfy the democratic wish, that 
is, to provide the people with the government that they want."); Koh, supra note 10, at 
1854 (describing domestic federal legislation as "a process notoriously dominated by 
committees, strong-willed individuals, collective action problems, and private rent- 
seeking"). 
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entry, dialogic federalism facilitates translation at various sites with 
broader participation, ensuring thicker, more complex understand- 
ings of human rights law. 
This dialogic approach is both descriptive and prescriptive. It is 
descriptive in that it theorizes by looking at existing intergovernmen- 
tal collaboration and dialogue. Dialogic federalism is also prescriptive 
in that it encourages state and local participation even where none ex- 
ists and posits a constitutional analysis about this participation. The 
constitutional analysis draws inspiration from scholarship on demo- 
cratic experimentalism, a theory of American constitutionalism that 
reinterprets democratic deliberation as a means of reducing the dis- 
tance between two visions of the Constitution . One vision rests on 
the Madisonian ideal of limited government based on complex divi- 
sions of powers.30 The other rests on the New Deal synthesis involving 
an all-powerful Congress that delegates much of its authority to expert 
agencies, which are presumably checked through judicial oversight 
when rights are violated.31 Dialogic federalism extends this theory by 
investigating new modes of democratic deliberation in the context of 
domestic implementation of international human rights law. In the 
international human rights context, these new modes of democratic 
deliberation must resolve the tension between the Madisonian proj- 
ect's commitment to decentralizing authorityng and the fact that the 
Constitution created national institutions "precisely to avoid such bal- 
kanization of foreign policy and international affairs."'3 
See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental- 
ism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 289 (1998) (conceiving of a new decentralized vision of 
government, "democratic experimentalism," through which the federal government 
partners with state and local governments to facilitate more participatory and demo- 
cratic modes of lawmaking). 
M Id. at 289. 
31 Id. at 290-91. 
32 Dorf and Sabel assert: 
Madison's understanding of the crucial role of power allocation led him to be- 
lieve that "[t]he end of constitutional [as opposed to statutory] interpretation 
was to determine which branch or level of government possessed the right to 
act in a particular area of governance, and in doing so, to preserve the equi- 
librium among institutions that the Constitution intended to establish." 
Id. at 289 n.66 (quotingJAcK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN 
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 345 (1996)). 
Koh, supra note 10, at 1841. In fact Madison was aware of this very need for na- 
tional institutions. See id. at 1825 n.4 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), and indicating that "[b]oth Edmund Randolph 
and James Madison complained at the Constitutional Convention about the Constitu- 
tional Congress's inability to give effect to the law of nations under the Articles of Con- 
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As a constitutional thesis, dialogic federalism reveals what both 
the traditional/hierarchical and revisionist/fragmentation models fail 
to fully capture and offers a normative framework for negotiating 
(rather than avoiding) the conflict and indeterminacy inherent in 
overlapping jurisdiction between national and subnational govern- 
ments. While these other models anticipate overlappingjurisdiction, 4
both seek to avoid possible conflicts through trumps: federal suprem- 
acy at one end of the spectrum, and states' rights at the other. By con- 
trast, dialogic federalism embraces conflict and utilizes it productively 
through reliance on dialogue, coordination, and negotiation, rather 
than trumps. By advancing a more consensus-based process that de- 
pends on multiple and concurrent levels of deliberation, this ap- 
proach seeks to address shortcomings inherent in both federally- 
imposed mandates (which often fail to gain support at the state and 
local level)'' and fragmented state and local initiatives (which often 
fail to translate into full-scale national compliance with international 
human rights laws absent coordination and dialogue). 
In offering a preliminary sketch of dialogic federalism, this Article 
is a first step in a larger theoretical project concerning a core dilemma 
confronting the human rights project: how to square the idea of uni- 
versal international standards with the tendency toward localism and 
particularity." Often asserted as a reaction to globalization, regional 
integration, and harmonization, localism (or, in the European con- 
text, "subsidiarity") resists homogenization and seeks to protect diver- 
sity and difference among national and subnational systems. Local- 
ism, therefore, asserts that decision making should be on the lowest 
possible level, and involve individuals, as opposed to their representa- 
tives, to the greatest extent possible. The initial conclusion which is 
introduced here, but which clearly requires further development, is 
that a federated society such as the United States (or the European 
Union) will be better equipped to resolve these tensions by develop- 
ing methods of democratic deliberation that bridge, on the one hand, 
the society's structural permeability to international human rights 
federation"). 
34 For example, these competing paradigms anticipate both federal and state 
courts having jurisdiction (though not always concurrently) over CIL. 
'' The backlash against affirmative action, busing, and other federally-imposed 
civil rights remedies might be read as a failure of top-down approaches, absent efforts 
to gain support at the state and local level. 
'' I have explored a related clash between universality and cultural relativism in 
Catherine Powell, Locating Culture, Identity and Human Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. 
REv. 201 (1999). 
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norms through multiple points of entry with, on the other hand, the 
coordination and extraction of these norms at the national level. 
This Article questions the efficiency of enabling fifty different leg- 
islative campaigns to promote human rights standards, rather than 
one. By the same token, this piece asks whether there can be any 
shortcuts.:3 While I do not have any empirical evidence at this stage of 
my project to suggest whether or not state and local processes are more 
open to individuals who wish to engage in standard setting, my argu- 
ment is simply that "localizing" international human rights law creates 
opportunities for standard setting that supplement, solidify, and 
deepen opportunities at the federal level)8 
Even assuming that the federal government undertook greater 
leadership in ratifying additional human rights treaties, in more fully 
implementing those it has not ratified, or in withdrawing reservations 
to treaty provisions, the argument here is that there would still be a 
value in state and local participation. By enabling democratic delib- 
eration at multiple levels, dialogic federalism facilitates a broader and 
deeper consensus over human rights commitments. At the same time, 
this approach depends on some form of coordination at the federal 
level, either by the federal government, a national network of state 
and local governments, or a national nongovernmental structure. Be- 
cause this paradigm relies on state and local government adoption of 
human rights standards as a supplement or enhancement to (not as a 
replacement or diminution of) the role of the federal government, it 
contrasts with the position taken by revisionist international law schol- 
ars. In arguing that the federal government's ability to implement, 
interpret, and enforce international law should be limited on grounds 
of federalism and separation of powers, these scholars would disable, 
rather than bolster, federal authority.:M 
Part I of this Article describes current challenges, in which the 
I would like to acknowledge Eyal Benvenisti for raising these important ques- 
tions in helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. 
38 Cf Mark Tushnet, Keeping Your Eye on the Ball: The Significance of the Revival of 
Constitutional Federalism, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1065, 1069-71 (1997) (suggesting that 
enabling links between subnational governments and transnational networks might be 
a way of reducing the democratic deficit in American politics). 
See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 11, at 870 
("We have argued that, in the absence of federal political branch authorization, [CIL] 
is not a source of federal law."); Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 
11, at 368-69 ("[T]he ... view that the new CIL is automatically incorporated into fed- 
eral common law is inconsistent with fundamental constitutional values.... [C] urrent 
federal statutes do not support incorporation of substantive rules of the new CIL of 
human rights."). 
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public is largely disengaged from the primary processes through 
which human rights law is incorporated by the federal government, 
because these processes discourage direct, broad-based deliberation of 
subject matter viewed as highly technical and not immediately appli- 
cable to people's daily lives. Part II investigates dialogic federalism as 
a possible solution. Part III describes three different ypes of dialogic 
federalism and provides case studies illustrating the first and most fre- 
quent form in which state and local governments adopt international 
human rights standards where the federal government has failed to 
ratify a treaty. Part IV of this Article locates dialogic federalism within 
the context of other scholarship on domestic incorporation of inter- 
national law in the United States and points to its contribution as an 
alternate framework. 
I. CURRENT CHALLENGES 
In other areas of law, scholars applaud what they describe as new 
forms of governance, in which power is decentralized away from the 
national government to enable citizens and other actors to utilize lo- 
cal knowledge in crafting solutions that more tightly fit local circum- 
stances.40 Yet, in the realm of international law, the predominant view 
is that the federal government has a virtual monopoly in foreign af- 
fairs and in the development of the two main sources of public inter- 
national law-treaties and customary international law.4' This view 
(represented in the traditional/hierarchical model described above) 
is overwhelmingly supported by the Framers' vision of the nation,42 the 
See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 29 (describing role for state and local govern- 
ments to work in partnership with the federal government o facilitate participatory 
and democratic approaches to lawmaking). 
But see infra Part IV for discussion of opposing views of revisionist cholars. 
42 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) ("[T]he peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a 
PART. The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct 
of its members."); THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) ("If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect 
to other nations."); Henkin, supra note 10, at 1559 n.19 (quoting 2 THE FEDERALIST 
No. 42, at 50 (James Madison) (New York, 1788)), in which James Madison "justified 
the clause in the Constitution giving authority to Congress to define offenses against 
the law of nations and criticized the absence of such authorization in the Articles of 
Confederation, which 'consequently [left] it in the power of any indiscreet member 
[i.e., state] to embroil the confederacy with other nations"'); id. at 1560 n.22 (quoting 
2 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 305 (Alexander Hamilton) (New York, 1788), in which 
"Alexander Hamilton cites 'cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations' as 
proper for the jurisdiction of federal courts"). 
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43~~~~~~~~4 Constitution," international law,44 and Supreme Court precedent re- 
flecting constitutional and policy considerations regarding the need 
for the nation to speak with "one voice" in foreign affairs.45 "Every 
schoolchild knows that the failures of the Articles of Confederation 
led to the framing of the Constitution, which established national 
governmental institutions to articulate uniform positions on such 
uniquely federal matters as foreign affairs and international law."46 
However, these institutions-federal courts (in the context of litiga- 
tion based on customary international law or treaty claims) and the 
Senate and executive branch (in the treaty-making context)-dis- 
courage direct broad-based participation. The relative absence of 
public engagement in these institutions contributes to the failure of 
these institutions to translate fully international law into domestic law. 
For a discussion of additional historical evidence, see FREDERICK W. MARKS III, 
INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
200-06 (2d ed., Scholarly Res. Inc. 1986) (1973), explaining the significance of foreign 
affairs in the creation of the Constitution, and the Framers' view of a strong central 
government; and Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1309-15, noting the Founders' commitment 
to nationalism in the realm of foreign affairs. 
Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, ? 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President has power, "with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the 
Senators present concur"), and id. at art. I, ? 8, cl. 10 (authorizing a national instittu- 
tion, Congress, "[t]o define and punish ... Offenses against the Law of Nations"), with 
id. at art. I, ? 10, cls. 1-2 (banning states from making treaties, alliances, agreements, or 
compacts with foreign powers without the consent of Congress; prohibiting states from 
engaging in war unless actually invaded; and forbidding them from laying imposts or 
duties on imports or exports without the consent of Congress). 
Jessup, supra note 15, at 741-43 (noting that the several states of the Union are 
entities unknown to international law). But see infra notes 207, 210 and accompanying 
text (discussing the limited ways in which subnational governments in the United 
States and Germany have participated in international agreements and regional ar- 
rangements). 
4See supra notes 14-15 (citing examples of Supreme Court opinions supporting 
the "one voice" approach to foreign affairs); see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 
232 (1942) ("If state action could defeat or alter our foreign policy, serious conse- 
quences might ensue. The nation as a whole would be held to answer if a [s]tate cre- 
ated difficulties with a foreign power."). 
Koh, supra note 10, at 1825; see also id. at 1825 n.4 (citing complaints by "[b]oth 
Edmund Randolph andJames Madison ... at the Constitutional Convention about the 
Continental Congress's inability to give effect to the law of nations under the Articles 
of Confederation"); MARKS, supra note 42, at 145 ("The lesson was clear: there was 
need for a strong national executive, and such an office would prove effective."); 
RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 29 ("[A]s most proposals to amend the Articles sought to 
free Congress from its debilitating dependence on the states, the agenda of national 
reform seemed designed to reduce rather than strengthen the connections between 
state and national politics."); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
24-25, 316-17 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (noting the inability of the Articles of Confed- 
eration to control State relations with foreign nations). 
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In the judicial context, while some judges in the United States are 
deeply engaged with international law,47 most judges are reluctant to 
apply these norms.38 This is the case even though ratified human 
rights treaties and customary international law are both law of the 
land in the United States.4' Under the Supremacy Clause, the law of 
the land is binding on the federal governments as well as on state and 
local governments.50 Even so, some judges dismiss the relevance of in- 
ternational law claims or are openly hostile to them. While ratified 
4Se, e.g., Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998) (affirming district court's 
denial of federal habeas relief to petitioner aising procedurally barred Vienna Con- 
vention claim), cert. denied sub nom., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 380 (1998) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (finding foreign national's argument 
for stay of execution not wholly without merit where the United States submitted an 
amicus brief acknowledging that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done 
Apr. 24, 1963, art. 42, 21 U.S.T. 77, 104, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 296, had been violated be- 
cause the foreign ational was not notified of his right o communicate with his consu- 
late); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Fifty-First Cardozo Memorial Lec- 
ture: Afrfirative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 
253, 281-82 (1999) (reflectingJustice Ginsburg's awareness of the relevance of interna- 
tional human rights law domestically); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 
830-31 (1988) (Stevens, J.) (relying on the laws of other nations in interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment in a juvenile death penalty case involving a fifteen-year-old); MARY 
L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIvIL RIGHTS 90-102 (2000) (highlighting evidence that in the 
1950s, the Supreme Court may have been swayed by arguments in the Justice Depart- 
ment's briefs indicating that segregation threatened the role of the United States as a 
global leader for democracy). 
48 See Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International 
Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 159, 160-75 (1993) 
(discussing reasons that prompt most national courts to approach international norms 
apprehensively and limit their application within ational egal systems). 
Henkin, supra note 10, at 1565; see also In re Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 
(1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and adminis- 
tered by the courts ... as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly pre- 
sented for their determination."). 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, ? 1, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land. 
1See, e.g., (reene 523 U.S. at 374 (denying certiorari and motion for stay of execu- 
tion in spite of an International court of Justice opinion granting a provisional order 
in a case alleging a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations); Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1999) (same); Thomp- 
son, 487 U.S. at 869 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that laws of other nations have 
little relevance to interpreting Eighth Amendment standards of cruel and unusual 
punishment in the context of executions of fifteen-year-olds, stating that "it is a Consti- 
tution for the United States of America that we are expounding"); see also Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (Scalia,J.) (rejecting the relevance of the law 
of other nations in interpreting the Eighth Amendment in a juvenile death penalty 
case involving sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds and stating that "[w]e emphasize that it 
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treaties and customary international law are "our law,"52 some mem- 
bers of the Supreme Court view international human rights law as an 
offshore body of law-an alien set of norms that exists out "6there," 
overseas, but have little relevance "here," in the United States.53 Miss- 
ing from this approach is recognition of how international law got 
"there," as well as the role Americans played in putting it "there."54 
A further constraint in the judicial context is the fact that the 
United States has neither ratified several of the major human rights 
treaties, 5 nor fully implemented treaties that it has ratified. Having 
declared most human rights treaties it ratifies to be non-self- 
executing, the United States has limited the enforceability of these 
treaties absent implementing legislation.: By not enacting implemen- 
is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive"). 
52 Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. 
5 See Knop, supra note 21, at 522-23 (using the "here" and "there" distinction to 
demonstrate the perceived distance between national and international law); see also 
LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 157-78 (1989) (using the "here" and "there" dis- 
tinction to demonstrate the perceived distance between U.S. law and the law of other 
countries). Compare supra note 47 (citing cases in which Supreme Court Justices rec- 
ognized the relevance of international law to interpreting U.S. constitutional c aims), 
with supra note 51 (citing cases in which Supreme CourtJustices failed to recognize the 
relevance of international law in interpreting U.S. constitutional c aims). 
54 For discussions of the role Americans played in developing and sustaining the 
international human rights framework, see MARYANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: 
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001); 
and President Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" speech, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual 
Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in 9 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 1940, at 663 (1941), which paved the way for critical con- 
cepts in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See also HENKIN, supra note 53, at 
156 ("American constitutionalism can proudly claim an important part in the devel- 
opment of international human rights, and in their dissemination to every continent 
and corner."); Oscar Schacter, International Law Implications of U.S. Human Rights Poli- 
cies, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 63, 66-69 (1978) (discussing how the United States has 
given impetus to recognition of core human rights as international legal obligations 
even in the absence of human rights treaties). 
For example, the United States has signed but not ratified, inter alia, CEDAW, 
supra note 3; Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 
1577 U.N.T.S. 44; and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. D, 95-2, at 13, 993 U.N.T.S. 4. 
Debates regarding the validity and impact of non-self-executing declarations 
remain. Compare LOuIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 201-02 (2d ed. 1996) (arguing that the use of non-self-executing decla- 
rations is "'anti-Constitutional' in spirit and highly problematic as a matter of law"), 
Lori F. Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non- 
Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 515, 532 (1991) (questioning whether non- 
self-executing declarations have either domestic or international effect), Martin S. Fla- 
herty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Su- 
preme Law of the Land", 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2095, 2097-99 (1999) (supporting the doc- 
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tating legislation where existing measures are absent and by not tak- 
ing other steps to achieve the substantive rights in ratified treaties, the 
United States fails to follow through on international obligations that 
require treaty signatories to implement these instruments through 
legislation and other measures.57 
The reluctance and open hostility some federal courts express to- 
ward international law claims reflect ambivalence toward the legiti- 
macy of international law as a source of law. While expert organiza- 
tions such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch (along with a small 
handful of law school-based human rights clinics) file amicus briefs 
introducing courts to these claims, most courts refuse to view interna- 
tional law claims as relevant to the resolution of specific cases. Be- 
cause international law is not claimed by the American people as "our 
law," some judges argue that we can legitimately ignore it. By con- 
trast, if Americans adopted international standards as their standards, 
then an analysis of international law would indeed be relevant to de- 
termining, for example, "evolving standards of decency" in the con- 
text of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment.i8 While adoption of international law as "our law" rarely 
trine of self-executing declarations in response to John Yoo), and Carlos Manuel Vaz- 
quez, The Four Doctrines of SelfExecuting Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L. L. 695, 700-22 (1995) 
(identifying four legitimate reasons for concluding that a treaty is non-self-executing), 
with John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the 
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1961-62(1999) [hereinafter Yoo, 
Globalism and the Constitution] (challenging the view that the Founders intended trea- 
ties to be self-executing), andJohn C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and 
Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2221-33 (1999) 
[hereinafter Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking] (replying to Flaherty's response to 
Yoo's earlier article defending non-self-execution). 
5 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 5, at art. 2, para. 2, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 24, 999 
U.N.T.S. at 173-74 ("[E]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the 
necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions 
of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be neces- 
sary to give effect o the rights recognized in the present Covenant."); id. at art. 2, para. 
3, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 24, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173-74 ("Each State Party to the present 
Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as 
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy...."); see also Conven- 
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish- 
ment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, arts. 4-5, S. TREAy Doc. No. 100-20, at 20, 
1465 U.N.T.S. 113, 114 (using similar language, but including requirement hat each 
State Party "ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law"). 
Compare Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 & n.1 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (find- 
ing that the laws of other nations have little relevance to interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in the context of execu- 
tions of people who were sixteen or seventeen years old at the time of the offense be- 
cause "it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive"), with Thompson v. 
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occurs in federal courtrooms, outside the courtroom international 
human rights law is increasingly shaping debates at the state and local 
levels in the context of the death penalty. 
In the legislative and executive branches of government, the cur- 
rent practice of adopting treaties involves what I call a "black box" ap- 
proach whose reliance on technical expertise in human rights allows, 
at best, modest engagement by members of the citizenry beyond 
Washington-based, inside-the-beltway nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs).5 By short-circuiting broad-based deliberation, this "black 
box" approach allows "transmittal of the international," not a full 
"process of translation from international to national.""" Because of 
the federal government's failure to engage in this process of transla- 
tion-in its neglect of international law as either an interpretive tool or 
as binding law-most Americans see international human rights law as 
an irrelevant offshore body of law.i' This Article argues that a more 
complete drawing down of international law depends on the devel- 
opment of more participatory mechanisms through which Americans 
can foster a deeper human rights culture. 62 By cultivating and ampli- 
fying the voices of state and local governments in the adoption and 
implementation of human rights, dialogic federalism assists in widen- 
ing the base of support for and increasing the legitimacy of these 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (Stevens,J.) (finding that the laws of other na- 
tions were relevant in interpreting the Eighth Amendment in a case concerning the 
execution of a person who was fifteen years old at the time the offense was commit- 
ted). 
9Cf Oliver Gerstenberg & Charles F. Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy: An Insti- 
tutional Ideal for Europe?, at 2, at http://www.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers.htm (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2001) (discussing how a similar dynamic is at work in the European 
Union, where "the sheer complexity [of the emerging system] and especially its reli- 
ance on technocratic deliberation, renders implausible even the most modest assump- 
tion of effective political oversight by an informed citizenry"). 
Knop, supra note 21, at 505 (emphasis added). 
fCf Dorothy Q. Thomas, Advancing Rights Protection in the United States: An Inter- 
nationalized Advocacy Strategy, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 15, 19 (1996) (describing evidence 
that "domestic rights groups in the United States have become less, rather than more, 
internationalized in their advocacy approach," and attributing this to "the U.S. gov- 
ernment's longstanding determination to insulate the national legal system from the 
influence of international law"). 
Karen Knop refers to this sentiment as Volkerrechtsfreundlich-"friendly to inter- 
national law." Knop, supra note 21, at 502 (using this term loosely and citing, for the 
more technical meaning, Brunno Simma et al., The Role of German Courts in the JnJbrce- 
ment of International Human Rights, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
DOMESTIC COURTS 71, 94-96 (Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997)). 
Of course, there is a chicken-and-egg problem here in that dialogic federalism both 
creates and requires a deeper human rights culture. 
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(33 norms. 
Rather than mobilize support for meaningful ratification of these 
treaties by convincing the public that treaty commitments will make a 
difference in their lives, the Washington-based NGO insiders reassure 
lawmakers that adoption of human rights treaties will not fundamen- 
tally disturb existing domestic law commitments. These reassurances 
become self-fulfilling in that lawmakers attach a range of conditions 
known as reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) to 
treaties to ensure that their impact is limited.4 RUDs, in turn, rein- 
force the lack of domestic constituent support for treaties adopted by 
stealth within the black box, since there appears to be little value 
added. However, without such conditions attached, human rights 
treaties could dramatically expand protections for disenfranchised in- 
dividuals.' These stealth treaties slip silently into law, encumbered 
with RUDs that water down their domestic impact. Not surprisingly, 
the perception that follows is that these treaties are ineffective, dead 
letters of the law, ensuring continued apathy for the human rights 
norms that these treaties convey. 
Of course, broadening participation in the deliberation and implementation of 
human rights law does not necessarily ensure that the public will accept these norms. 
After all, knowledge does not equal acceptance. However, this Article argues that it is 
better to have fewer international human rights norms incorporated into domestic law 
that enjoy broader support and legitimacy than to have many international norms 
formally incorporated that lack de facto legitimacy. 
These RUDs frequently include, for example, a boiler-plate declaration pro- 
nouncing that a treaty is non-self-executing, as described above. For further discussion 
of RUDs, see Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification cf Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of 
Senator Bricker, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 341, 349 (1995), explaining that U.S. RUDs upholding 
federalist ideals limit the impact of treaties and agreements; and Curtis A. Bradley & 
Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
399, 419 (2000), explaining that non-self-executing "declarations are designed to pre- 
clude the treaties from being enforceable in U.S. courts in the absence of implement- 
ing legislation." 
Even with RUDs, including non-self-executing declarations, treaties may provide 
some value. See Martha F. Davis, International Human Rights and United States Law: 
Predictions of a Courtwatcher, 64 ALB. L. REV. 417, 428-36 (2000) (demonstrating the 
value of international human rights law as interpretive tool); Connie de la Vega, Civil 
Rights During the 1990s: New Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 423, 
467-70 (1997) (proposing that government entities can use non-self-executing treaties 
to defend programs that protect or promote the human rights goals of the treaties); see 
also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (offering a 
canon of statutory construction that directs that "an act of [C]ongress ought never to 
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains"); 
Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory 
Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990) (suggesting ways to use the Charming Betsy 
principle as an interpretive tool). 
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Scholars who follow the revisionist/fragmentation model may ar- 
gue that RUDs represent resistance by domestic constituencies to ef- 
forts by international elites that would disrupt local practices, and that 
in this sense, RUDs reflect democracy at work. In fact, this is what 
Senator Bricker and other segregationists argued for in trying to limit 
the reach of the treaty power in the 1950s.'if However, there is no evi- 
dence today that RUDs mark an attempt to preserve local practices. 
Because ratification occurs with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
and not the House, it is hard to argue that RUDs truly reflect local 
practices. 
Rather, the adoption and compliance of human rights treaties by 
stealth paves the way for limited and cramped incorporation of inter- 
national protections with conditions that restrict the reach of these in- 
struments. Stealth treaties are also troubling because they result in 
the average person on the street having little to no knowledge of the 
international human rights protections to which she is entitled. 
Clearly there is a paradox if the only way to ensure that the executive 
branch and Senate adopt treaties is by stealth, which in turn ensures 
that treaties are ineffective, dead letters of the law. 
II. DIALOGIc FEDERALISM 
To move beyond these challenges, this Article proposes dialogic 
federalism as a possible solution. Rather than embrace zero-sum un- 
derstandings of the respective roles of federal and nonfederal systems, 
a dialogic approach depends on cooperation between these systems to 
translate broad international law principles into concrete domestic 
laws and policies. Borrowing insights from both the revision- 
ist/fragmentation and traditional/hierarchical models described 
above, dialogic federalism seeks to both (1) deepen the democratic 
legitimacy of international human rights laws through state and local 
innovation in implementing these laws, and (2) broaden forms of na- 
tional coordination of this innovation. 
Achieving these twin goals involves bridging the two visions of the 
Constitution alluded to above:67 its commitment to complex divisions 
of powers (in accord with its Madisonian inspiration) on the one 
hand, and its stake in national institutions designed to address the in- 
See NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A 
HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 99-100, 108-10 (1990) (describing how the Bricker Amend- 
ment would have protected states' rights in the context of treaty ratification). 
Supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. 
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ability of the Continental Congress to give effect to the law of nations 
under the Articles of Confederation, on the other hand. The latter 
vision was bolstered by federal initiatives of the New Deal and civil 
rights eras. By arguing for ways to afford citizens and other actors 
greater participation in using local knowledge to craft solutions that fit 
the particular circumstances of their communities,8iS democratic ex- 
perimentalists have tried to theorize new forms of governance that ac- 
commodate the essence of these two visions. The tension between 
these two visions is reflected in the society's erratic jurisprudence on 
federalism, which prohibits Congress from commandeering states 
even while it permits Congress to deeply influence state lawmaking 
through constitutional spending powers and conditional preemp- 
tion.'1 Democratic experimentalists propose to resolve this dilemma 
by enabling state and local governments to partner with (rather than 
replace) federal government in more meaningful ways by facilitating 
more participatory and democratic modes of lawmaking. 
Similarly, dialogic federalism envisions intergovernmental coop- 
eration and dialogue as a means of addressing this constitutional co- 
nundrum and democratizing the implementation of human rights law 
in the United States. This approach "reinterprets democratic delib- 
eration to advance the Madisonian project of using the institutions of 
government itself to foster practical cooperation."70 It is in this spirit 
that a dialogic approach is offered "not as an alternative to the Ameri- 
can constitutional tradition but as an interpretation of it."7' As an in- 
terpretation of this tradition, dialogic federalism acknowledges the 
federal government's foreign affairs role provided under the U.S. 
Constitution and anticipated by international law.72 This model also 
recognizes the risk of "multiple variants of the same international law 
rule"73 that the establishment of a national constitution was designed 
to avoid. 
However, the rationale behind the need for the nation to speak 
See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 29, at 314, 316-23 (presenting the basic fea- 
tures of a "subnational, pragmatist government"). 
See id. at 419-28 ("[T]he Supreme Court oscillates ... between revisionary reviv- 
als of the distinction [between federal and state powers] and weary criticism of the re- 
vision."). 
7 Id. at 289. 
71 Id. 
2 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (describing authority for the fed- 
eral government's role under the U.S. Constitution and international law, respec- 
tively) . 
73 Koh, supra note 10, at 1832. 
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with "one voice" through the President with respect to other coun- 
tries-that is, to avoid sending contradictory signals regarding U.S. re- 
lations with other countries-loses its bite in the context of domestic 
incorporation of international human rights law.74 In the foreign af- 
fairs context, contradictory signals may be sent if, for example, a state 
or local government imposes sanctions on a foreign country that are 
inconsistent with federal policy toward that country. Thus, in Crosby v. 
National Foreign Trade Council, the Supreme Court held that a Massa- 
chusetts sanctions law regarding Burma was preempted by federal leg- 
islation directing the President to develop "a comprehensive, multi- 
lateral strategy to bring democracy to and improve human rights 
practices and the quality of life in Burma."'7 In the context of domes- 
tic incorporation of international human rights law, the risk of send- 
ing contradicting signals in U.S. relations with other countries is sig- 
nificantly less. Yet, a subnational approach to domestic incorporation 
of human rights may lead to the development of "divergent and per- 
haps parochial state interpretations" 7 of international standards, 
which the Founders sought to avoid.77 Moreover, since the parameters 
of foreign and domestic are often intermingled,78 there is an outside 
chance that such pronouncements could affect U.S. relations with 
other countries in ways that would obscure "the President's power to 
speak and bargain effectively with other nations."79 A possible way to 
For a classic statement of the rationale behind the "one-voice" principle, see 
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000), stating, "[t]he Presi- 
dent's maximum power to persuade [in foreign affairs] rests on his capacity to bargain 
for the benefits of access to the entire national economy without exception for en- 
claves fenced off willy-nilly by inconsistent political tactics." Id. 
7 Id. at 369 (quoting Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104- 
208, ? 570(c), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-166 (1997)). 
7 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964). 
7See supra note 42 (discussing the Founders' opinions about American foreign 
polic) 
pol C)f INDERPAL GREWAL & CAREN KAPLAN, INTRODUCTION TO SCATTERED 
HEGEMONIES: POSTMODERNITY AND TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST PRACTICES 10-13 (In- 
derpal Grewal & Caren Kaplan eds., 1994) (discussing blurring of the line between 
global and local). 
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 382. For example, a state government's narrow interpreta- 
tion of the scope of international law obligations in the death penalty context can im- 
plicate and has implicated the nation's relations with other countries. See, e.g., La- 
Grand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. No. 104 (June 27) (holding that Arizona failed 
to notify two German nationals facing the death penalty of their rights under the Vi- 
enna Convention on Consular Relations, which requires notifying an arrested or de- 
tained foreign national of his right to consult with a consular official, in a case brought 
by Germany against the United States to challenge the death sentences), available at 
http://www.icj-cji.org; Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
2001] DIALOGIC FDfERALISM 265 
limit this risk is by preempting state and local government attempts to 
convert their incorporation of international human rights laws into 
pronouncements of international law. Under this approach these 
state and local enactments would operate as nothing more than state 
and local law, adopted pursuant to authority that clearly exists at the 
subnational level. 
In fact, enabling state and local governments to partner with the 
federal government in incorporation of human rights law may convert 
weakly-legitimated norms developed at the international level into 
norms that are more strongly legitimated at a local level. By bringing 
human rights lawmaking closer to the people whose rights are af- 
fected, a dialogic federalist approach has the added benefit of democ- 
ratizing the implementation of international law norms. Further- 
more, incentivizing state and local governments to experiment with 
the direct incorporation of human rights law would address, to a large 
extent, the federalism concerns raised in the context of federal incor- 
poration of norms perceived as falling within areas traditionally rele- 
gated to states such as family law and criminal law." 
These federalism concerns are raised even though, according to 
the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland, the treaty power authorizes 
Congress to legislate under the Necessary and Proper Clause"' in areas 
beyond those specifically conferred on Congress by Article I, Section 8 
of the Constitution, and the treaty power is not subject to most Tenth 
Amendment limitations.82 The proposed Bricker Amendment in the 
1950s would have formally limited the treaty power to the extent it ex- 
(Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. No. 99 (Nov. 10) (holding that because the state of Virginia 
failed to notify a Paraguayan ational facing the death penalty of his right o consult a 
consular official, the United States violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela- 
tions, in a case brought by Paraguay against the United States to challenge the death 
sentence), available at http://www.icj-cji.org. 
But see Dorf & Sabel, supra note 29, at 419-28 (suggesting that the Supreme 
Court's jurisprudence on federalism is misguided); Resnik, supra note 17 (manuscript 
at 3) (arguing that we need to be less categorical about what we view as "truly local" 
and "truly national"); Reva Siegel, She, the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARv. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (arguing that the 
Nineteenth Amendment could be read as subverting traditional understandings of 
family, women's roles in the family, gender equality, and federalism). 
U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 8, cl. 18. 
252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) ("No doubt the great body of private relations usually 
fall within the control of [a] [s] tate, but a treaty may override its power."). While Mis- 
souri v. Holland holds that most Tenth Amendment limitations do not apply to the 
treaty power, it is less clear whether the anticommandeering doctrine, which prohibits 
Congress from conscripting state legislators or officers to enforce federal law, applies 
to the treaty power. 
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tends congressional authority beyond the constraints of federalism. 
Despite the 1954 defeat of the Bricker Amendment, the current prac- 
tice by the Senate and executive branch of attaching federalism un- 
derstandings8' and other conditions to treaties during the ratification 
process achieves the same result.85 Arguably, a federalism understand- 
ing "'serve [s] no legal purpose,"' because "such a declaration of intent 
does not decrease the United States' international obligations and 
does not decrease in the slightest the power of Congress to implement 
those obligations."86 However, in light of the Supreme Court's new 
3See KAUFMAN, supra note 66, at 99-100, 108-10 (describing how the Bricker 
Amendment would have protected states' rights in the context of treaty ratification). 
For example, see the U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR: 
That the United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented 
by the Federal Government o the extent that it exercises legislative and judi- 
cial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state 
and local governments; to the extent that state and local governments exer- 
cise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall take meas- 
ures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that the competent authori- 
ties of the state or local governments may take appropriate measures for the 
full fulfillment ofthe Covenant. 
U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR, supra note 5, at 8071. 
Professor Gerald Neuman observes, "The legislative history explains that an un- 
derstanding rather than a reservation was employed, because 'the intent is not to mod- 
ify or limit U.S. undertakings under the Covenant but rather to put our future treaty 
partners on notice with regard to the implications of our federal system concerning 
implementation."' Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST. 
COMMENT. 33, 51-52 (1997) (quoting S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 18 (1992) (reprint- 
ing the George H.W. Bush administration's explanation)). 
While a federalism understanding represents a fairly explicit demonstration of 
federalism concerns, a more implicit way the U.S. expresses these concerns is by enter- 
ing a reservation on a treaty provision concerning a right that traditionally falls within 
the ambit of state regulation. See, e.g., U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR, supra note 5, at 8070 
(providing a U.S. reservation on the provision prohibiting the juvenile death penalty). 
85 See DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF 
EISENHOWER'S POLITIcAL LEADERSHIP 89 (1988) (discussing Eisenhower's promise to 
exercise treaty-making power only within "traditional imits," consistent with the 
Bricker Amendment); Henkin, supra note 64, at 349 (explaining that the Senate and 
executive branch's current practice of attaching RUDs to treaties achieves the goal 
Senator Bricker sought). 
Neuman, supra note 84, at 52 (quoting Henkin, supra note 64, at 346). Note 
that Professor Neuman is making two distinct points here regarding the impact of a 
federalism understanding: one international nd the other domestic. The first point 
concerns the impact on the United States' international obligations, while the second 
concerns the impact on its domestic authority to implement hose obligations. On the 
domestic point, Professor Spiro comes to a different conclusion. See Spiro, supra note 
17, at 576-77 (arguing that "federalism understandings constitute a formal institutional 
statement of law"). Professor Spiro notes: 
Indeed, the pattern of a defeated amendment followed by a practice consis- 
tent with the amendment's ubstance bears some resemblance to Bruce Ack- 
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federalism jurisprudence,87 Congress may be hesitant to regulate con- 
duct deemed to be quintessentially local in nature (such as criminal 
and family law) .88 At the very least, at the domestic level, a federalism 
understanding represents a political gesture to reassure state and local 
governments that the federal government will not use the treaty in 
question to disturb existing divisions of power between national and 
subnational units. 9 At the international level, the United States often 
points to deference to states' rights as the reason why it cannot meet 
international human rights requirements.:" In fact, it is not clear 
whether the federal government can impose these requirements on 
state and local governments through federal directives without violat- 
ing the anti-commandeering doctrine, which prohibits the federal 
government from issuing such directives. ' Thus, supporting state and 
local governments to participate in domestic implementation of hu- 
erman's and David Golove's description of how the congressional-executive 
agreement came to win constitutional legitimacy outside of the Article II 
treaty process. ... In both episodes, proposed amendments were defeated in 
part because of informal institutional greement o respect their substance. 
Id. at 576 n.32 (citing Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is Nafta Constitutional?, 108 
HARv. L. REv. 799 (1995)). On the international point, Spiro agrees with Neuman 
that federalism understandings lack international effect. Id. at 577; see also ICCPR, su- 
pra note 5, at art. 50, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 38, 999 U.N.T.S. at 185, which applies to 
"all parts of federal States without any limitations or exceptions." 
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the fed- 
eral government may not compel the states "to administer or enforce a federal regula- 
tory program"); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995) (finding that a federal gun 
control aw banning firearm possession in local school zones exceeds Congress' Com- 
merce Clause power); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding 
that Congress may not commandeer the states' legislative processes by directly compel- 
ling states to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program). But see Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (reversing the Florida Supreme Court on an issue of state law). 
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598-99 (2000) (striking down the 
"civil rights remedy" provision in the Violence Against Women Act as unconstitutional, 
holding that Congress lacked the authority to regulate the sphere reserved for the 
states). For a critique of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Morrison, see 
Resnik, supra note 17. 
9 Neuman, supra note 84, at 52-53 ("The federalism understanding does, how- 
ever, signal the political reality that some members of Congress are reluctant o exer- 
cise existing federal power [to enforce treaties] in areas of traditional state regula- 
tion."). 
See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53rd Sess., 1405th mtg. 11 12-13, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1405 (1995) ("[T]he decision to retain [the death penalty] re- 
flected a serious and considered democratic hoice of the American public.... [The 
juvenile death penalty was retained because a] large majority of states permitted juve- 
niles to be tried as adults in grave cases involving capital offences at. . . 16 or 17.") 
! See supra notes 82, 87 (explaining anticommandeering doctrine and cases, re- 
spectively). 
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man rights would clear the way for compliance at the federal level, as 
state and local noncompliance would no longer justify federal non- 
compliance based on federalism concerns. 
Facilitating state and local involvement in implementing human 
rights standards may also address democratic deficits inherent in the 
making and implementation of international law at the national level. 
Because the international system is a system of states, national gov- 
ernments-not individuals-participate in the development and 
adoption of international norms. While NGOs are increasingly gain- 
ing a voice in treaty-making arenas and other fora where important 
international law decisions are made, access to these decision-making 
processes is often mediated by elaborate credential requirements that 
limit participation.2 
Additionally, as discussed above, the general public is disengaged 
from the primary processes through which human rights law is incor- 
porated at the national level. As the work of democratic experimen- 
talists and other scholars suggests, similar democratic deficits are re- 
flected in the formation of domestic legislation in the United States, 
as well as in other contexts including the European Union.:4 The 
omission of the House from the treaty-ratification process is a factor 
that may undermine further the democratic legitimacy of interna- 
tional human rights treaty law. Subnational, participation in incorpo- 
rating human rights laws strengthens democratic deliberation of these 
laws. 
Participation by subnational governments and NGOs in incorpo- 
rating human rights law can usefully be considered in the context of 
Cf Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REv. 167, 
170, 202-11 (1999) (proposing a theory of transnational institutions that could offer 
"more effective opportunities for democratic participation in national and transna- 
tional decision making"). 
9 See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 28, at 100-01 (highlighting an interpretation of 
public choice analysis of legislative organization in which committee members who are 
unrepresentative of the Congress as a whole, and thus likely unrepresentative of the 
people as a whole, dominate the legislative process); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 29, at 
270-92 (proposing as a solution "democratic experimentalism" which combines federal 
learning with the protection of the federated jurisdictions and the rights of individu- 
als); Tushnet, supra note 38, at 1069-71 (discussing the democratic deficit inherent in 
national politics in the U.S. and suggesting that general cultural transformation, rather 
than the revival of constitutional federalism, may be the way to eliminate such a defi- 
cit). 
4 See Gerstenberg & Sabel, supra note 59, at 2-5 (noting that the complexity of 
multilevel governance in the European Union "renders implausible even the most 
modest assumption of effective political oversight by an informed citizenry"). 
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the "disaggregation" of sovereignty, 95 the permeability of national 
borders, and the ascendancy of a transnational civil society. Interest- 
ingly, the theory that the State is disaggregating concludes that the 
formation of transnational networks between and among government 
bureaucrats and judges within these States leads to greater convergence 
and harmonization, not less.: Conceivably, intonational networks of 
NGOs and/or state and local governments may lead to a similar con- 
vergence of norms.: At the same time, these local enactments might 
be read as facilitating public policy experimentation. More diffuse 
modes of implementing human rights law at various levels of govern- 
ment are consistent with what other scholars have described as the 
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. 
INT'L L. 503, 505, 537 (1995) [hereinafter Slaughter, International Law] (envisioning "a 
world of liberal States," in which the State and sovereignty are disaggregated into 
"component political institutions"); see also SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS 92 (1998) ("[T]here is an unbundling of sovereignty[:] ... the reloca- 
tion of various components of sovereignty onto supranational, nongovernmental, or 
private institutions."); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., 
Sept./Oct. 1997, at 183, 184 ("The [S]tate is not disappearing, it is disaggregating into 
its separate, functionally distinct parts. These parts ... are networking with their coun- 
terparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, transgovern- 
mental order."); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1223 
(1999) (extending Professor Slaughter's disaggregation thesis to include disaggrega- 
tion of federal and subfederal actors). 
96See Tadashi Yamamoto & Jessica T. Mathews, Foreword to THE THIRD FORCE: 
THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY, at vi (Ann M. Florini ed., 2000) (arguing 
that the "border-spanning networks" that comprise transnational civil society "are a 
real and enduring force in the international relations of the twenty-first century"); see 
also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGuLAToRYAGREEMENTs 27 (1995) ("[E]ven [the 
largest and most powerful States] cannot achieve their principal purposes ... without 
the help and cooperation of many other participants in the system, including entities 
that are not [S]tates at all."); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS 
BEYOND BORDERS: Ai)VO(A(CY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 3-5 (1998) (de- 
scribing transuational advocacy networks as communication structures that use infor- 
mation strategically "[t]o influence discourse, procedures, and policy" on an interna- 
tional scale); Benvenisti, supra note 92, at 169 (advocating a "transnational conflict 
paradigm" that "shows how domestic interest groups often cooperate with similarly 
situated foreign interest groups in order to impose externalities on rival domestic 
groups"); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law 
Home, 35 HOuS. L. REV. 623, 647-48 (1998) (describing the role of transnational norm 
entrepreneurs, i.e., those who assist States to internalize norms in the transnational 
legal process). 
9See Slaughter, International Law, supra note 95, at 512-13 (discussing the correla- 
tion between a high level of transnational networks and a convergence in the reluc- 
tance to use force among liberal democracies). 
( See Spiro, sufpra note 95, at 1267 ("Retaliation at the international level is in- 
creasingly governed by norms rather than merely by interests, and indeed is now being 
undertaken by a variety of actors beyond nation-states."). 
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emergence and utilization of norm entrepreneurs, who develop 
transnational networks as communication structures that use informa- 
tion strategically.99 
At the same time, drawing on the work of democratic experimen- 
talists,"'? this Article argues that the federal government has an impor- 
tant role to play in coordinating and extracting workable norms from 
the various local initiatives. There is precedent for the federal gov- 
ernment coordinating and encouraging participation of state and lo- 
cal governments in international lawmaking in the trade area, which 
could provide a possible model.101 To avoid the problem of "divergent 
and perhaps parochial state interpretations of the same interna- 
tional law rule, the federal government or other national entity must 
99 See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 96, at 16, 18-22 (highlighting the ability of trans- 
national advocacy networks "to quickly and credibly generate politically usable infor- 
mation and move it to where it will have the most impact"); see also Benvenisti, supra 
note 92, at 202-03 (discussing the ability of transnational institutions to reduce infor- 
mational asymmetries by, inter alia, "monitoring compliance of the various domestic 
actors" with institutional policies and by "providing access and soliciting input from 
NGOs representing a variety of interest groups"). 
MSee, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 29, at 288 (calling "the overall system of pub- 
lic problem solving that combines federal learning with the protection of the interests 
of the federated jurisdictions and the rights of individuals democratic experimentalism"); 
Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards: How Transparency, Competition, and Sanc- 
tions Could Improve Working Conditions Worldwide, BOSTON REv., Feb./Mar. 2001, at 
http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR26.1/fung.html (proposing a strategy for strengthen- 
ing labor standards that would use monitoring and public disclosure of working condi- 
tions to create firm-level incentives for improvement); Brad Karkkainen et al., After 
Backyard Environmentalism: Toward a Performance Based Regime of Environmental Regula- 
tion, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 690, 690 (" [D] emocratic experimentalism combines the vir- 
tues of localism, decentralization, and direct citizen participation with the discipline of 
national coordination, transparency, and public accountability." (citation omitted)); 
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 
COLUM. L. REv. 458, 462-63 (2001) (exploring the potential for a regulatory approach 
in which "normative elaboration occurs through a fluid, interactive relationship be- 
tween problem solving and problem definition within specific workplaces and in mul- 
tiple other arenas, including but not limited to the judiciary"). 
1 See George Bermann, Federalism and the Enforceability of United States Treaty 
Obligations 59 (Jan. 21, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For ex- 
ample, the federal government created an Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Commit- 
tee (IGPAC) to provide subnational governmental input into international trade nego- 
tiations in response to the requirement under the 1974 Trade Act that the President 
seek advice from the "non-federal" government sector. Id. Approximately thirty to 
forty state and local government officials, including governors, participate in the 
IGPAC. Id. at 59 n.172. Additionally, because state and local governments demanded 
similar assurances in the statutes implementing NAFTA and the Uruguay Round 
Agreements, in both instances the legislation creates a process of consultation for sub- 
national governments. Id. at 59. 
1 02 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964). 
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serve the important role of coordinating information regarding local 
initiatives. In exchange for permitting state and local governments 
the flexibility to experiment, national coordinating agencies (de- 
scribed below) should require state and local actors to share their 
knowledge regarding implementation and compliance,"13 in order to 
encourage exchange of information, mutual learning, and coordina- 
tion. In working with these state and local actors as true partners in 
devising broad national objectives (e.g., securing women's human 
rights), national coordinating agencies could then monitor compli- 
ance with these objectives through best practice performance stan- 
dards developed at the local level and shared with other communities 
while, at the same time, strengthening democratic accountability 
through participation of people in decision making that affects 
them.'04 
While dialogic federalism anticipates that the federal government 
will play the role of coordination, where the government is unwilling 
or unable, other national entities could fill this gap. These entities 
might include national networks of state and local governments' or 
One model for assessing compliance with a treaty from which other states and 
localities could learn is San Francisco's CEDAW gender analysis guidelines, which assist 
in monitoring the implementation of CEDAW, the main treaty guaranteeing women's 
rights, at the local level. See S.F. COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN & CEDAW TASK 
FORCE, A GENDER ANALYSIS: IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION 
OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (1999) [hereinafter CEDAW TASK 
FORCE, A GENDER ANALYSIS], available at http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/cosw/cedaw/pdf/ 
cedaw.pdf. For further discussion see infra note 130, describing San Francisco's 
CEDAW gender analysis guidelines, and note 143, explaining that San Francisco's 
CEDAW ordinance has been identified by the United Nations Development Funds for 
Women in its collection of best practices worldwide for implementing CEDAW. 
104 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 29, at 267. Dorf and Sabel are quick to distinguish the 
broad freedom they seek for subnational government actors from the abdication of 
federal responsibility hinly disguised as experimentalism in the context of welfare re- 
form achieved through devolution. Id. at 434-38. Far from offering states increased 
freedom to experiment, the 1996 Welfare Reform Act imposed a number of federal 
goals concerning work requirements, as well as federal restrictions on eligibility (for 
example, by declaring legally resident aliens ineligible for Supplemental Security In- 
come or food stamps). Id. at 435 & n.541, 436. Clearly, this "new legislation flies in 
the face of the localism that ostensibly animates it." Id. at 437. 
Cf. Resnik, supra note 17 (manuscript at 57 n.263) (noting that the Supreme 
Court missed an opportunity to develop a more complex understanding of federalism 
when it failed to consider the role of national organizations of state elected officials in 
developing a nuclear waste disposal proposal that was adopted by Congress). In New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Court struck down the Congressional ini- 
tiative adopting the proposal on the grounds that the requirements itplaced on states 
violated anticommandeering principles. 
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NGOs."'t Thus, a dialogic federalism account of constitutionalism dif- 
fers from democratic experimentalism in at least one critical respect: 
it envisions a role for state and local participation even before there is 
a federal commitment to coordinate this participation. 
When it plays the coordinating role, the federal government may 
be able to sidestep a central dilemma that has arisen in the context of 
enforcing international norms in a federalist system: while Congress 
cannot commandeer states under U.S. domestic law, international law 
essentially depends on a form of commandeering.'07 On my reading, 
this dilemma results in part because the U.S. federal government is 
caught between a negative rights paradigm that stems from its domes- 
tic legal traditions and a mixed-rights approach that captures both 
negative and positive obligations, which spring from the fuller con- 
ception of rights found in international human rights law. Indeed, 
international law requires national governments to implement legisla- 
tion and makes national governments liable for failure to bring con- 
stituent actors into compliance.'IN By working cooperatively with state 
and local governments to achieve domestic implementation of human 
rights, the federal government need not commandeer the states.'!' 
See Benvenisti, supra note 92, at 206 (proposing a theory of transnational insti- 
tutions in which well-informed NGOs could step in to play coordinating roles where 
government does not). 
107 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 29, at 427 n.515 ("[I]nternational law . . depends 
for its enforcement largely on national implementing legislation-what he Court 
would call commandeering."). 
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 5, at art. 2, para. 2, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 24, 999 
U.N.T.S. at 173-74 ("[E]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take 
necessary steps ... to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to 
give effect o the rights recognized in the present Covenant."). Note that the federal 
government can also be held accountable for violations of both subnational govern- 
ments, see, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 5, at art. 50, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 38, 999 
U.N.T.S. at 185 ("The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of 
federal States without any limitations or exceptions."), and private actors, when the 
federal government ison notice and has the capacity to take corrective action, but fails 
to act. SeeVelasquez Rodriquez Case (Hond.), 4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 4, at 
para. 172 (1988) (explaining that a State may be internationally responsible for human 
rights violations that are not directly imputable to it because of a "lack of due diligence 
to prevent the violation or respond to it"), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/ 
humanrts/iachr/b-l 1_1 2d.htm. 
l For a classic statement on the inefficiencies involved in commandeering states, 
see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: MWy State Auton- 
omy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty"Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 893-900 (1998). 
See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 145-57 (1993) (examining 
the problems that arise when the federal government imposes limits on the powers of 
the states to bargain with their citizens within the context of various government pro- 
grams). 
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Curiously, this cooperative federalism is reinforced by a sense of 
competition as well. As NGOs increasingly attempt to use the global 
marketplace as a means through which to exact economic retribution 
on governments (at whatever level) that fail to observe human rights, 
this economic discipline facilitates competition that stimulates "races 
to the top" toward improved compliance. I" This "co-petition""' ap- 
proach to federalism maintains the national government as a primary 
site for international lawmaking and accountability, while encourag- 
ing cooperation with subnational authorities, who in turn may be in- 
centivized to adopt human rights standards through competitive pres- 
sures that "ratchet" standards upward.12 
III. A DIALOGIC FEDERALIST TYPOLOGY 
From a dialogic federalist perspective, intergovernmental dialogue 
proceeds along at least three different tracks, depending on the link- 
age between national and subnational governments. The first track 
involves state and local adoption of international human rights stan- 
dards where the federal government has failed to ratify a treaty. As 
has been the case with CEDAW, state and local enactments adopting 
treaty standards call for federal ratification, and in this sense invite 
dialogue with the federal government."' A second track involves state 
Cf. Spiro, supra note 17, at 568-69, 588-89. Note that Professor Spiro goes a step 
further than I am prepared to go in this Article in that he suggests that it would be 
"more efficient" o hold state and local governments liable for violations along with the 
federal government under a "condominium responsibility" concept-an approach that 
would operate along the lines of joint and several iability under tort law. Id. In addi- 
tion to suggesting applying the stick, Professor Spiro also suggests using the carrot ap- 
proach by enabling state governments o be treaty partners. Id. at 590-95. As a possi- 
ble precedent, he explores the opt-in model of treaty accession used in the trade 
context. Id. at 592-93. Specifically, Spiro discusses the Agreement on Government 
Procurement, which applies to "sub-central" governments only to the extent that such 
entities agree to coverage, as is indicated by notification to the World Trade Organiza- 
tion by the relevant central government (with the latter, remaining the only formal 
parties to the agreement). Id. "The regime gives sub-national uthorities, in effect, an 
option to accept the treaty regime." Id. at 592; see also Paul Blustein, Thinking Globally, 
Punishing Locally, WASH. POST, May 16, 1997, at GI (explaining that economic sanc- 
tions imposed by state and local governments against objectionable foreign regimes 
"raise the specter of multi-national companies being forced to make costly choices be- 
tween giving up lucrative contracts with government agencies or foregoing business in 
some of the world's most promising markets"). 
IC ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRYJ. NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION 11-39 (de- 
scribing ways in which cooperation and competition can be mutually reinforcing in the 
business context). 
112 Fung et al., supra note 100, at 2. 
Similarly, cities that have urged their states and the federal government to sup- 
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and local efforts to implement international obligations that the fed- 
eral government has adopted through ratification or other acknow- 
ledgement that it is bound (for example, through the application of 
customary international law) but not fully implemented. As has been 
the case with the consular notification requirement for foreign na- 
tionals arrested and detained-an obligation under the Vienna Con- 
vention on Consular Relations-state and local legislative adoption of 
such requirements invites dialogue with federal efforts to implement 
the requirement more fully, and in so doing may allay federalism con- 
cerns the United States has expressed in the context of international 
criticism where the obligation has not been observed.'14 A third 
track-involving state and local efforts to apply human rights princi- 
ples contained in treaty provisions for which the United States has en- 
tered a reservation-is possible, but to my knowledge is still hypotheti- 
cal. In the context of juvenile death penalty litigation, for example, 
defense lawyers have argued that the U.S. treaty reservation concern- 
ing the prohibition on the juvenile death penalty in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights"' is invalid; however, state and 
port the U.N. Commission on Human Rights' call for a death penalty moratorium may 
be read as initiating dialogue with these states and the federal government. 
114 For an expression of the U.S. federalism concerns in this context, see La()-and 
Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. No. 104 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-cji.org, a 
case challenging the death sentences imposed on two German nationals by the state of 
Arizona. In that case, the United States contended that one "constraining factor" on 
its ability to satisfy the international obligation regarding consular notification was "the 
character of the United States of America as a federal Republic of divided powers." Id. 
at para. 95. While the United States has adopted the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, it has frequently failed to ensure the enforcement of the rights of foreign 
nationals under the treaty. See Rebecca E. Woodman, International Miranda? Article 36 
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, J. KAN. B. ASS'N, June/July 2001, at 41-42 
(suggesting that failure to enforce the rights of foreign nationals under the Conven- 
tion "not only violates international law, it weakens the status and authority of the 
United States in the international community"). Some states and local governments 
such as Florida have incorporated the consular notification obligation directly into 
state law. FLA. STAT. ANN. ?? 901.26(3), 288.816(2)(f) (West 2001). These subna- 
tional efforts invite dialogue with federal efforts to provide for more effective imple- 
mentation of the treaty. See, e.g., Catherine Brown, Consular Notification Liaison and 
Legal Advisor, State Department, International Law & the Work of Federal & State 
Governments, Remarks at the American Society of International Law 2001 Annual 
Meeting (Apr. 4-6, 2001) ("[W]hat I have been trying to do is get federal, state and lo- 
cal law enforcement judicial and other officials to comply with these notification re- 
quirements."). 
See U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR, supra note 5, at 8070 ("[T]he United States re- 
serves the right... to impose capital punishment on any person ... duly convicted 
under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, includ- 
ing such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age."). 
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local governments have not yet undertaken legislative initiatives to ad- 
vance this prohibition or to repeal laws that are inconsistent with it. 
Only the first track along which dialogic federalism operates is 
explored in further detail here. It is currently the most active ap- 
proach and, therefore, provides the richest source for examination. 
State and local adoption of international human rights standards, 
where the federal government has failed to ratify a treaty, represents a 
response to the federal government's failure to incorporate the stan- 
dards. One could view with despair the federal government's failure 
to ratify several human rights treaties,"I seeing this as an indication 
that the national government is unwilling or unable to implement 
these norms through the normal channels provided under the U.S. 
Constitution and anticipated by international law."7 This failure is 
rooted in the structure of international law, which derives primarily 
from the will and consent of national governments."8 However, 
rather than view these conditions with despair, one could also see this 
failure as the result of decisions made by federal officials who were 
democratically elected and who, in this sense, represent our democ- 
racy at work. A dialogic approach views these institutional realities "as 
creating the occasion for, indeed in part anticipating, a radical re- 
definition of our democratic and constitutional ideals.""19 Therefore, 
See supra note 55 for examples of treaties the United States has signed but not 
ratified. 
117 Paradoxically, the initiative taken by state and local governments in supporting 
human rights where the federal government is unwilling or unable to do so mirrors 
developments in the international criminal justice area where, under the notion of 
complementarity, international institutions step in to enforce human rights norms 
where national governments are unwilling or unable. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the In- 
ternational Criminal Court, June 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1003 (establishing an inter- 
national court that is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions). Of course, in 
the United States, the federal government historically also has played this back- 
stopping role, particularly with respect to civil rights, where, until quite recently (and 
to some extent today), the assertion of "states' rights" and "local control" indicated a 
lack of willingness or ability by state and local governments to enforce civil rights. See, 
e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLEJUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BoAI?) oFE U,)uAcIAoN 
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 748-78 (1976) (framing Brown v. Board 
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and civil rights legislation in general, as efforts by the 
federal government to control local enforcement of civil rights). 
118 See Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in 
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 21, 41 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) ("[T]he reality is that 
[S] tates and other international actors have recourse to diverse methods of setting 
agendas, influencing behavior, and supplementing and shading international obliga- 
tions."). 
" Gerstenberg & Sabel, supra note 59, at 5. 
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this Article takes an optimistic view of these conditions, seeing in them 
an opportunity to reconceptualize available avenues for deliberation 
and develop new methods that broaden and deepen consensus over 
human rights law. 
The "adoption" of human rights treaties and standards at the state 
and local levels largely represents a form of communication through 
which people and communities, who are more effectively able to mo- 
bilize at the local level, signify the need for the federal government to 
play a more active role in human rights lawmaking.'211 In fact, many of 
the ordinances and resolutions adopted by state and local govern- 
ments explicitly call for the federal government to adopt particular 
human rights treaties and standards.'21 In this sense, the direct incor- 
poration of human rights norms by state and local governments 
should be seen as providing a method for creating momentum and 
building pressure for change at the federal level. 
Following the approach taken in scholarship on democratic ex- 
perimentalism, I am going to theorize by looking at the facts, that is, 
by looking at what is actually happening on the ground in two areas of 
state and local activity where a federal role is absent: women's human 
rights and capital punishment. 
1. State and Local CEDAW Activity: Despite the representations 
made by the Clinton administration to "bring Beijing home," the U.S. 
government has done very little at the federal level to incorporate the 
commitments undertaken by governments at the United Nations 
Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, China, in 
1995.22 An Inter-Agency Council on Women was established to coor- 
dinate the incorporation of aspects of the Beijing Platform for Ac- 
tion.'23 However, the work of the Inter-Agency Council has been 
largely symbolic.124 Additionally, the United States has yet to ratify 
Cfi Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A Gen- 
eral Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1520-27 (2000) (viewing the democratic state 
as a collective agent and analyzing the expressive dimensions of state action). 
See infra notes 131-133, 138-141, 159 and accompanying text. 
See Benjamin D. Knaupp, Comment, Classifying International Agreements Under 
U.S. Law: The Beijing Platform as a Case Study, 1998 BYU L. REV. 239, 262 ("The United 
States has signed the [Beijing] Platform, but has proclaimed that it is not binding .... 
Without a clear understanding of the legal status of the Beijing Platform and other 
U.N. declarations, confusion and tension between Congress and the President in the 
sphere of foreign affairs powers will worsen."). 
Rhonda Copelon, The Indivisible Framework of International Human Rights: A 
Source of SocialJustice in the U.S., 3 N.Y. CInY L. REv. 59, 77 (1998). 
124 Id. at 77 ("While [the Inter-Agency Council] gives women a limited route to 
influence government policy... the potential of the Beijing Platform is not felt be- 
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CEDAW, the main treaty guaranteeing women's rights. Furthermore, 
while the executive branch pointed to the Violence Against Women 
Act (VAWA) as evidence of its compliance with the ICCPR in its re- 
port to the U.N. Human Rights Committee,'25 part of VAWA was re- 
cently struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court.126 In United States v. 
Morrison, the Supreme Court held that Congress lacked authority to 
enact the civil remedy that provides a cause of action for VAWA.'27 In 
so doing, the Court completely ignored the fact that international 
human rights law (as incorporated into U.S. law) not only authorizes 
Congress to enact effective remedies to challenge gender-based vio- 
lence, but in fact compels the U.S. government to provide such reme- 
dies to meet current obligations under the treaty.'28 
While federal implementation of international standards concern- 
ing women's rights has lagged, some local governments have incorpo- 
rated CEDAW directly into local law. The City of San Francisco pio- 
neered this approach by making CEDAW part of its local law in 1998, 
three years after the Beijing Conference.'2 With respect to the re- 
quirements imposed by CEDAW at the international level, the city's 
Juvenile Probation Department and its Department of Public Works 
have filed reports containing gender analyses of their delivery of serv- 
cause many U.S. women are unaware of its provisions ... [or] do not use it as a plat- 
form for action or an instrument of accountability."). 
See Press Release, United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Committee 
Begins Considering Initial Report of United States 8, U.N. Doc. HR/CT/400 (Mar. 29, 
1995) (reporting statement of Jo Ann Harris, assistant attorney general in the United 
States Department ofJustice Criminal Division, that VAWA "was the most comprehen- 
sive federal effort to date to address violence against women"). 
126 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (concluding that Con- 
gress lacked the constitutional authority to enact VAWA's civil remedy for victims of 
gender-motivated violence under both the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses). 
127 
Id. 
12S See, e.g., ICCPR, supia note 5, at art. 2, para. 3, S. EXEc. Doc. E, 95-2, at 24, 999 
U.N.T.S. at 174 (requiring that each State party to the Covenant take necessary steps to 
give effect to the rights recognized in the Covenant and to ensure effective remedies 
should such rights be violated); Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of International Law 
Scholars and Human Rights Experts in Support of Petitioners at 2, United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (No. 99-0029) ("The text of the treaty, in conjunction 
with subsequent unanimous and binding interpretations by the international commu- 
nity, make clear that the ICCPR requires the U.S. to provide protection from gender- 
based violence from both private persons and public officials."); see also supra notes 56- 
57 and accompanying text (discussing the United States' failure to enact the legislation 
required to fulfill its international treaty obligations). 
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMINIsrRATIVE CODE, ch. 12K (2001), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/sanfranadmin/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-j.htm&2.0. 
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ices, employment practices, and budget allocation.130 In signing the 
city ordinance, Mayor Willie Brown, Jr., pointed out: "[t]he United 
States is the only industrialized country in the world that has yet to rat- 
ify CEDAW.''131 Sending a signal to Washington, Mayor Brown stated: 
"We want to set an example for the rest of the nation because it is long 
overdue."132 Similarly, explaining why her organization and other ad- 
vocacy groups mobilized in support of the city ordinance, Krishanti 
Dharmaraj, the Executive Director of the Women's Institute for Lead- 
ership Development (WILD) for Human Rights said: "We couldn't 
just keep waiting for the federal government."133 While it may be too 
soon to evaluate the impact of the ordinance, its value may be more 
than symbolic. The city ordinance may have a concrete impact on the 
allocation of services (such as extra street lighting in high crime areas 
to assist in preventing violence against women,134 and summer sports 
programs for girls), employment (in city agencies135 and in the private 
136 137 sector ), and differential arrest patterns . 
See CEDAW TASK FORCE, A GENDER ANALYSIS, supra note 103, at 14-64 (docu- 
menting the efforts made by these city departments to conform with CEDAW require- 
ments) . 
Gretchen Sidhu, San Francisco Plunges Ahead in Adopting a CEDAW Treaty of Its 
Own, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 1998, ? 13, at 8. 
Id. San Francisco has long been a leader in human rights, having hosted, for 
example, the U.N. Conference on International Organizations, during which the U.N. 
Charter was adopted. See The UN Charter as History (Jane D. Weaver rep.), 89 AM. SoC'Y 
INT'L L. PROC. 45, 59 (1995) ("[T]he status of the individual in human rights first re- 
ceived recognition in the San Francisco UN Conference."). 
Sidhu, supra note 131. 
See id. ("[E]xtra street lights [are] something women have demanded for years 
and male city planners have routinely ignored."). 
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 12K.3(a) (1) (2001) ("The 
City shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women and 
girls in the City of San Francisco in employment and other economic 
opportunities . .: . ."), available at http://www.amlegal.com/sanfranadmin/ 
lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-j.htm&2.0. The City of San Francisco is the largest em- 
ployer in the Bay Area. Sidhu, supra note 131. 
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 12K.3 (2001) ("The City shall 
ensure that the City does not discriminate against women in areas including employ- 
ment practices, allocation of funding and delivery of direct and indirect services."), 
available at http://www.amlegal.com/sanfranadmin/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main- 
j.htm&2.0; see also Sidhu, supra note 131 (suggesting that the City may be able to re- 
quire that women be appropriately represented in management of private firms bid- 
ding for city contracts and licenses). 
Women arrested in San Francisco say they are treated differently from men. 
For example, Sonia Melara, executive director of San Francisco's Commission on the 
Status of Women, explains that women dancers in legal exotic clubs have been ar- 
rested as prostitutes, while the male club owners go free. Sidhu, supra note 131. 
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The symbolic value of the San Francisco ordinance, however, can- 
not be underestimated. Following San Francisco's lead, the Los Ange- 
les City Council has adopted a Resolution in Support of CEDAW.18 
Moreover, as of August, 2000, 39 cities, 17 counties, 16 states, and the 
Territory of Guam had adopted resolutions calling for the United 
States to ratify CEDAW.'" Unlike San Francisco's CEDAW law, the 
resolutions of the other cities and states are nonbinding. In most 
cases, the resolutions can be read as seeking local implementation as 
well as national ratification.140 In this sense, much of the local 
CEDAW work is directed toward the goal of building momentum to 
pressure the U.S. government o ratify CEDAW, rather than enlisting 
cities and states to function as laboratories for a range of experimen- 
tation.14 Nonetheless, the coordination of these local efforts to affect 
national norms operates along democratic experimentalist lines in 
that local governments are learning from each other through national 
organizations of state and local elected officials, as well as through 
networks of scholars and activists. 
Besides the value of building political momentum, this local treaty 
work also helps to translate broad abstract principles contained in 
human rights treaties into concrete, definable standards on the 
ground. Assuming the federal government eventually adopts 
CEDAW, the precedent developed at the local level will help inform 
implementation at the national and even international level. This lo- 
cal work on the periphery, then, may help redefine core activities, and 
in so doing may ultimately help undermine the dichotomy between 
core and periphery.'42 
Los Angeles City Resolution in Support of CEDAW, L.A. City Council (L.A., 
Cal., 2000), http://www.ci.la.ca.us/csw/html/cswpge3d.htm. 
WILD for Human Rights: CEDAW Around the U.S., at 
http://www.wildforhumanrights.org/cedaw-aroundus.html (last visited Nov. 26, 
2001). Other cities, such as Seattle, are considering adopting similar resolutions. See 
Seattle Women's Commission: Legislative Action, at http://www.cityofseattle.net/ 
civilrights/swc/legislat.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2001) (listing "Support any CEDAW 
legislation" as one of six legislative priorities for the 2001 state legislative session). 
Cf Resnik, supra note 17 (manuscript at 52) ("[CEDAW p]roponent's goals are 
to change both local and national laws; their means deploy local actors working in 
concert with outsiders."). 
4 Id. (manuscript at 52-53) ("To conceive of local action as. . . indigenous to a 
particular place is to miss how much of that work is a product of broad efforts to shift 
social policy."). 
149 
i Cf Dorf & Sabel, supra note 29, at 445 ("[A]s democracy increasingly comes to 
mean decentralized, direct deliberation, it will be increasingly difficult to distinguish 
the citizen's participatory rights in these particular settings from those more general 
'process-perfecting' rights to democratic participation that are frequently taken as the 
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But, rather than take a passive role, the federal government 
should play a more active role in these local efforts. For example, the 
federal government could use the Inter-Agency Council on Women as 
a national coordinating agency, pooling information, monitoring best 
practices,143 and feeding these participatory experiences from local 
communities into the effort to build national support for federal 
treaty action. 
2. State and Local Calls for a Death Penalty Moratorium: State and lo- 
cal calls for a death penalty moratorium often rely on international 
standards. In recent years, the United States has come under intense 
international criticism for its death penalty practices.144 However, 
many states continue to execute minors and allow tremendous race 
disparities in the application of the death penalty,145 in violation of in- 
ternational law."46 While the death penalty itself is permitted under 
most fundamental of all political liberties."). 
The San Francisco ordinance has already been identified by the United Na- 
tions Development Fund for Women in its collection of best practices worldwide for 
implementing CEDAW. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR WOMEN, BRINGING 
EQUALITY HOME: IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL 
FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, available at 
http://www.unifem.undp.org/cedaw/cedawen7.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2001). 
See, e.g., Roger Cohen, America the Roughneck (Through Europe's Eyes), N.Y. TIMES, 
May 7, 2001, at Al0 (quoting the British paper, The Guardian, which called American's 
position on the death penalty "morally untenable," and explaining that America's 
"ease" with the death penalty is contributing to "the growing hostility to the United 
States"); Editorial, Europe's Viev of the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2001, ? 4 
(Week in Review), at 12 ("European politicians and intellectuals, who view the death 
penalty as a human rights issue, are incredulous that Americans support a punishment 
that fails to deter crime, targets mainly those who cannot afford a decent lawyer, is 
used on the mentally retarded and has often gotten the wrong man."). 
See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, KILLING WITH PREJUDICE: RACE AND THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN THE USA, at http://www.amnestyusa.org/rightsforall/dp/race/ 
index.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2001) [hereinafter KILLING WITH PREJUDICE] (showing 
"how the death penalty in the U.S. is applied disproportionately on the basis of race, 
ethnicity and social status"). 
For the prohibition on the juvenile death penalty adopted by the United Na- 
tions see ICCPR, supra note 5, at art. 6, para. 5, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 25, 999 
U.N.T.S. at 175; and Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 55, at 55, stat- 
ing that "capital punishment ... shall [not] be imposed for offenses committed by per- 
sons below eighteen years of age," which is not ratified by the United States. For the 
prohibition on race discrimination adopted by the United Nations, see ICCPR, supra 
note 5, at arts. 2, 26, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 24, 31, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173, 179, codify- 
ing member nations' obligation to protect the rights of all citizens equally. See generally 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, S. 
EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2, at 1 (1965) (condemning racial discrimination and undertaking 
";to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial 
discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races"). 
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international law as an exception to the right to life,'47 the Second Op- 
tional Protocol to the ICCPR calls for its abolition,'48 and the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights has called for a moratorium 
on executions.149 
In justifying U.S. death penalty practices to the Human Rights 
Committee-the treaty body that oversees the ICCPR-during the 
United States' first compliance hearing, State Department Legal Advi- 
sor Conrad Harper testified that the decision to retain the death pen- 
alty represented a democratic choiceY'' Having entered a reservation 
to the ICCPR provision barring juvenile executions, the United States 
is one of only six nations that continues to execute minors. The 
United States stands in the company of Iran, Nigeria, and Saudi Ara- 
bia as the only countries that execute people for crimes they commit- 
ted asjuveniles.'1' 
On the domestic front, there is a growing sense that the error 
rates and race disparities153 in the application of the death penalty 
require its reevaluation. However, from a domestic political perspec- 
tive, federal attempts to restrict or regulate the states' use of the death 
penalty would run afoul of federalism concerns-a point frequently 
raised by U.S. representatives in international fora in which U.S. death 
147 ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 6, para. 2, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 25, 999 U.N.T.S. at 
174-75. 
148 Second Optional Protocol, supra note 5. 
Resolution Supporting Worldwide Moratorium on Executions, Hum. Rts. Comm. 
(Apr. 1999), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/UN- 
Statements.html#resolution (last visited Oct. 25, 2001). 
150 U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53rd Sess., 1405th mtg. 1 12, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/SR.1405 (1995) (summarizing testimony by American representatives that 
"the decision to retain [the death penalty] reflected a serious and considered demo- 
cratic choice of the American public" and that "it was not appropriate in that demo- 
cratic system to dismiss considered public opinion and impose by fiat a different 
view"). 
America's Shame-Killing Kids, National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, 
at http://www.ncadp.org/html/factl .htm(last visited Oct. 25, 2001). By comparison, 
Pakistan and Yemen have just recently changed their laws to exclude the execution of 
offenders under the age of eighteen. People's Union for Civil Liberties, Amnesty Inter- 
national: Children and the Death Penalty; Executions Worldwide Since 1990, Apr. 2001, at 
http://www.pucl.org/reports/International/2001/executions.htm. 
152 See, e.g., James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 
1973-1995, at http://www.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman (last vis-
ited Oct. 25, 2001) (presenting statistical evidence to show that America's death pen- 
alty system is persistently and systematically fraught with error). 
1See, e.g., KILLING WITH PREJUDICE, supra note 145 (C[R] acial discrimination per- 
vades the U.S. death penalty at every stage of the process ...). 
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penalty practices are criticized.154 Under international law, however, 
national governments can be held accountable for treaty violations of 
subnational governments and their officials.'55 As described above, a 
way to sidestep this paradox of federalism is to incentivize state and 
local governments themselves to adopt human rights tandards. 
State and local initiatives calling for a moratorium cite interna- 
tional standards as authority, in the sense that international norms 
provide an interpretative d vice, not binding legal standards. For ex- 
ample, in a resolution calling on state officials in Maryland as well as 
federal officials to place a moratorium on executions, the Baltimore 
City Council cites an Amnesty International source that indicates that 
80% of all executions in 1999 occurred in 4 countries-the United 
States, China, Iran, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.156 
Philadelphia has also passed a resolution calling for the Common- 
wealth of Pennsylvania to impose a moratorium on executions.'57 
Pointing out that "every nation in Europe and the vast majority of the 
democratic nations of the world have abolished the death penalty," 
the Philadelphia resolution also relies on the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission's call for an international moratorium on the death pen- 
alty. '8 The Village of Yellow Springs, Ohio and the City Council of 
154 See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1405th mtg. 1 13, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/SR.1405 (1995) (reporting that a large majority of American states permitted 
juveniles to be tried as adults in grave cases involving capital offenses at the age of ei- 
ther sixteen or seventeen). 
See, e.g., Bermann, supra note 101, at 60 ("[T]he treaty violations for which a 
nation is responsible include those committed not only by their own officials but also 
by sub-national governments and their officials."); see also IVAN BERNIER, 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF FEDERALISM 83 (1973) ("On the authority of cer- 
tain decisions, federal states are considered by most international law writers as re- 
sponsible for the acts or omissions of their component units."); IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 449 (4th ed. 1990) ("A state cannot plead 
the principles of municipal law, including its constitution, in answer to an interna- 
tional claim."); Spiro, supra note 17, at 580 n.47 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, ? 207(b) & reporter's note 3 
(1987)); Report of the International Law Commission on State Responsibility, [1971] 2 Y.B. 
Int'l L. Comm'n 193, 257, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/217/ADD2). But see John Norton 
Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248, 249 (1965) (discussing the 
area of "uncertainty regarding the relationship between state policies and the national 
forei n relations power"). 
A Council Resolution Concerning: In support of a Moratorium on the Death 
Penalty (House Bill 388), Balt. City Council, Council Bill 00-0032 (Balt., Md. 2000). 
157 Resolution: Calling for a Moratorium on the Imposition of Any Death Penalty 
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Until a Fair and Impartial Study of the Applica- 
tion of the Death Penalty Is Conducted, Phila. City Council (Phila., Pa., 2000). 
158 Id. 
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Santa Cruz, California, have also relied on the U.N. Humnan Rights 
Commission's call for a death penalty moratorium in passing resolu- 
tions requesting that their respective states and the federal govern- 
ment impose a moratorium on the death penalty.'5' 
The federal government has a role to play in coordinating state 
and local initiatives that call for the observance of human rights stan- 
dards in the death penalty context. One possibility is for the federal 
government to play a coordinating role through the Inter-Agency 
Working Group on Implementation of Human Rights Treaties estab- 
lished under Executive Order 13,107 to oversee implementation of 
the Race and Torture Conventions.160 In particular, the Inter-Agency 
Working Group could review best practices and pool information so 
that these participatory experiences could filter up from local com- 
munities to build support for national standards. Such support is 
necessary, for example, to create momentum for a review of the U.S. 
reservation on the ICCPR provision barring juvenile executions. Ac- 
cording to Executive Order 13,107, the executive branch is required 
to review the appropriateness of all existing reservations to human 
rights treaties."" 
IV. THE ROLE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIALOGUE IN SHAPING 
NATIONAL LAW 
The dialogic approach to incorporating human rights law ex- 
plored here engages the debate over federalism and international 
lawmaking by advancing a path between the two approaches on either 
side of this debate. The traditional (and predominant) approach 
held by international law scholars is that, as a constitutional and prac- 
tical matter, the federal government is the primary site for implemen- 
tation and enforcement of international law. This traditional view 
takes many forms. In response to revisionist critics who claim federal 
courts are restricted from interpreting customary international law on 
federalism grounds,1( scholars who follow the traditional approach have 
Call for a Moratorium of Executions, Council of the Vill. of Yellow Springs, Res. 
99-39 (Vill. of Yellow Springs, Ohio 1999); A Resolution of the City Council of the City 
of Santa Cruz Requesting That the State and Federal Governments Enact and Adopt 
Legislation Imposing a Moratorium on Executions at Least Until Fair and Equitable 
Policies and Practices Are Implemented, City Council of the City of Santa Cruz, Res. 
NS-23, 806 (Santa Cruz, Cal., 1998). 
Exec. Order No. 13,107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991-68,992 (Dec. 15, 1998). 
Id. at 68,991. 
162 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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defended the authority of federal courts in interpreting customary in- 
ternational law.' 3 These scholars draw support from the vision of the 
nation's Founders, who, due to the failure of the Articles of Confed- 
eration, framed a Constitution establishing a national government "to 
articulate uniform positions on such uniquely federal matters as for- 
eign affairs and international law."' I4 Additionally, these scholars 
point to the Constitution's assignment of international lawmaking 
powers to the federal government and divestment of such powers 
from state and local governments.165 Moreover, these scholars note 
that state and local governments are unrecognized as actors within the 
structure of international law."'(5 Finally, these scholars argue that Su- 
preme Court precedent acknowledges constitutional and policy con- 
siderations underlying the need for the nation to speak with "one 
voice" in foreign affairs through the president.'16 In response to revi- 
sionist critics who claim federal courts are restricted from interpreting 
customary international law on separation of powers grounds, scholars 
who subscribe to the traditional view defend the jurisdiction of federal 
courts over international claims, even in the absence of action from 
the political branches enacting customary international law.'(i8 To 
some extent, traditionalists also support the self-executing nature of 
international law in the absence of implementing legislation from 
See, e.g., Koh, supra note 10, at 1827 (defending the traditional ability of federal 
courts to incorporate norms of CIL into federal aw as "a sensible, settled rule that all 
three federal branches and the fifty states have consistently followed"); Neuman, supra 
note 10, at 376 (arguing that federal courts should continue to "apply only those 
norms [of CIL] that external evidence demonstrates embody genuine international 
legal obligations binding on the United States"); Stephens, supra note 10, at 397 
("[T]he determination of the content of customary international law and of whether 
or not it applies in a given situation is a federal question, which triggers federal court 
jurisdiction and on which federal courts decisions are binding on the states."). 
164 Koh, supra note 10, at 1825; see also supra note 42 and accompanying text (pre- 
senting historical arguments that the framers intended that the federal government 
control U.S. foreign relations). 
See supra note 43 and accompanying text (analyzing the text of the Constitution 
to argue that the federal government retains a virtual monopoly over U.S. involvement 
in foreign affairs). 
S ee, e.g.,Jessup, supra note 15, at 743 ("The several states of the Union are enti- 
ties unknown to international law."). 
167 Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000); see also cases 
and sources cited supra notes 14-15, 45 (analyzing Supreme Court cases and other legal 
scholarship indicating that uniform foreign policy requires federal court jurisdiction). 
See, e.g., Koh, supra note 10, at 1842 ("[W]hen customary international norms 
are well-defined, the executive branch has regularly urged the federal courts to deter- 
mine such rules as matters of federal aw."). 
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Congress,'6} under the theory that political branches have already had 
input in the making of customary international law (through state 
practice) and of treaties (through the ratification process, in which 
the President "makes" treaties with the advice and consent of the Sen- 
ate). Furthermore, these scholars criticize the practice through which 
political branches attempt to limit the role of the federal courts in 
considering treaty matters by attaching non-self-executing declara- 
tions to treaties. These scholars question whether such non-self- 
executing declarations have either domestic or international effect,1'" 
and criticize these declarations as violating the spirit of the Supremacy 
Clause's declaration that treaties are the law of the land. 7' Relying on 
Supreme Court precedent, these scholars also argue that the treaty 
power authorizes Congress to legislate in areas beyond those specifi- 
cally conferred on Congress and is not subject to Tenth Amendment 
limitations (at least of the non-commandeering variety) .'7 
Revisionist scholars challenge the traditional view by claiming that 
the federal government's role in making international law is limited 
by federalism and separation of powers principles. The revisionist 
view finds different forms of expression that correspond to and chal- 
lenge the various aspects of the traditional approach outlined above. 
Perhaps the most prominent attack by revisionists has been on the 
role of the federal courts in determining customary international 
law.' 7 On both federalism and separation of powers grounds, revi- 
ISee, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 56, at 2151-52 (focusing on eighteenth-century 
British and American history to argue that the traditional understanding of treaties as 
self-executing is correct); Vazquez, supra note 56, at 718 (arguing that Congressional 
action is needed only in situations where legislative authority is required to do "what 
the treaty makers agreed to do but lack the [constitutional] power to accomplish"). 
lSee, e.,g., Damrosch, sul/ra note 56, at 515 (observing a pattern in which the Sen- 
ate tries to weaken the domestic legal effect of treaties by attaching non-self-executing 
declarations and arguing for the limited use of these declarations); Henkin, supra note 
64, at 346 ("The Framers intended that a treaty should become law ipsofacto, when the 
treaty is made; it should not require legislative implementation to convert it into 
United States law."). 
171 See HENKIN, supra note 56, at 201-02 (calling the recent practice of declaring 
some apparently self-executing treaties non-self-executing "anti-Constitutional"). 
172 See, e.g., Golove, supra note 8, at 1281-83 (defending the viability of Missouri v. 
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), and arguing that the Tenth Amendment does not act as 
an affirmative r straint on Congress' delegated treaty power). 
173 The two scholars most closely identified with this position are Curtis Bradley 
andJack Goldsmith. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 
11, at 856 (rejecting the traditional inclusion of international law within federal 
common law due to a lack of "domestic federal authorization for federal courts to 
interpret and apply [CIL] as federal law"); Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, 
supra note 11, at 349 (defending their earlier position that "federal courts should not 
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sionist scholars contend that federal courts lack jurisdiction over cus- 
tomary international law in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's fa- 
mous statement in Erie that "there is no federal general common 
law."'174 Because customary international law is a form of common law, 
revisionists claim that determinations of customary international law 
are questions of state law that "federal courts should not apply ... as 
federal law without some authorization to do so by the federal politi- 
cal branches."'75 The federalism critique also extends to the treaty 
context in the sense that revisionists claim Congressional treaty power 
is subject to the Tenth Amendment and cannot extend to areas be- 
yond Congress' enumerated powers. 76 Additionally, revisionists ques- 
tion traditionalist concerns over the practice of declaring treaties non- 
self-executing by insisting that this practice safeguards the separation 
177 of powers. 
The main fault lines between the traditional and revisionist ap- 
proaches-federalism and separation of powers-essentially center on 
questions of authority. Consider how each dimension of the debate 
frames a question reflecting anxiety over who has authority to bind 
and what laws bind. Do federal courts have independent authority to 
make determinations regarding customary international law (absent 
action by the political branches), or does this authority reside solely in 
state courts, as courts of general jurisdiction?178 Does Congress have 
apply [CIL] as federal law without some authorization to do so by the federal political 
branches"). For earlier work on the same point, see Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist 
View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 672, 707-16 (1986), in which 
he states, "courts should never apply customary international law except pursuant to 
political branch direction"; and A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and Interna- 
tional Cases, 20 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 48 (1995), stating "[CIL] is not federal law and thus 
provides no authority for imposing limits [on the federal government]." 
174 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see Bradley & Goldsmith, 
Current Illegitimacy, supra note 11, at 324 (arguing that to be consistent with Erie, a "new 
federal common law must be authorized in some fashion by the U.S. Constitution of a 
federal statute"). 
175 Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 1 1, at 349. 
176 See Bradley, Treaty Power, supra note 11, at 435 ("[W] hatever limitations the 
Tenth Amendment does impose, it is not evident. . . why these limitations should not 
apply to the treaty power."). 
177 See, e.g., Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 56, at 2074-80 (using his- 
torical and comparative evidence to respond to traditionalist critiques of non-self- 
execution as being at odds with the Supremacy Clause and inconsistent with the Fram- 
ers' notions); Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 56, at 2220 ("Treaties can- 
not receive judicial enforcement in areas that fall within Congress's Article I, Section 8 
powers, without statutory implementation by Congress."). 
78 Compare Henkin, supra note 10, at 1559 ("[It makes no sense] that questions of 
international law should be treated as questions of state rather than federal law ...."), 
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authority to exercise its treaty power in areas beyond its enumerated 
powers (as Missouri v. Holland held), or is the treaty power subject to 
Tenth Amendment limitations reserving certain powers to the 
states? 179 Do federal courts have authority to consider claims brought 
under a treaty where the political branches have failed to provide im- 
plementing legislation executing the treaty?180 It is precisely on ques- 
tions of authority-specifically, who has authority to implement, inter- 
pret, and enforce international law in the U.S.-that the two 
approaches both converge (in examining these questions) and di- 
verge (in the answers they give to these questions). While diametri- 
cally opposed on where they come out, as two sides framing a promi- 
nent debate, traditionalists and revisionists essentially ask the same set 
of questions regarding authority. For the purposes of this Article, I 
Jessup, supra note 15, at 742 ('iJudicial precedent indicates] that international law 
constitutes a 'federal general common law."'), Koh, supra note 10, at 1827 ("[U]nder 
current practice, federal courts regularly incorporate norms of customary international 
law into federal law."), Neuman, supra note 10, at 384 ("The [s]tates have no reserved 
sovereignty to act on the international plane; the Constitution was designed to take 
that away from them."), and Stephens, supra note 10, at 397 ("[T]he determination of 
the content of customary international law and of whether or not it applies in a given 
situation is a federal question, which triggers federal court jurisdiction and on which 
federal court decisions are binding on the states."), with Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique 
of the Modern Position, supra note 11, at 817 ("[Viewing CIL as part of a federal common 
law] is founded on a variety of questionable assumptions and... is in tension with 
fundamental constitutional principles."), and Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, 
suftra note 11, at 349 ("[I]f [CIL] is not federal law, federal courts are not to apply it 
unless they determine that it is part of state law."). 
179 Compare Golove, supra note 8, at 1081-82 (arguing that the Tenth Amendment 
does not create subject matter limitations on the treaty power because the latter is a 
power delegated to the federal government), with Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power 
and American Federalism Part II, 99 MICH. L. REv. 98, 111-18 (2000) (replying to Profes- 
sor Golove and arguing that federalism concerns limit the treaty power), and Bradley, 
Treaty Power, supra note 11, at 434-36 (claiming congressional treaty power is subject to 
Tenth Amendment limitations reserving certain powers to the states). 
Compare Damrosch, supra note 56, at 527 (questioning whether non-self- 
executing declarations have either domestic or international effect as regards appar- 
ently self-executing treaties), Flaherty, supra note 56, at 2151-52 (focusing on eight- 
eenth-century British and American history to argue that the traditional understanding 
of treaties as self'executing is correct), and Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Trea- 
ties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2169-73 (1999) (analyzing the text of the Supremacy 
Clause to argue that treaties of the United States do not require implementing legisla- 
tion to assume authority as law), with Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 56, 
at 2040-69 (presenting a historical argument that treaties should be considered non- 
self-executing in order to preserve the important distinction between domestic and 
international policy-making), and Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 56, at 
2233 ("[S]elf-execution would have the unfortunate effect of reading out of our Con- 
stitution important aspects of the separation of powers and federalism, and would also 
undermine the principle of popular sovereignty."). 
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am particularly intrigued by the ways in which this debate over author- 
ity clashes on the issue of federalism,'81 with the national orientation 
of the traditional approach on one hand and the state and local orien- 
tation of the revisionists on the other. 
I agree with the traditional view that the Constitution provides a 
robust role for the federal government in domestic implementation of 
human rights law. In this Article, I provide a different ype of insight 
about the federal role. In outlining possible ways in which the federal 
government can share authority with state and local governments, this 
Article resists a zero-sum approach to the question of authority and 
suggests that norms both trickle down to subfederal governments and 
trickle up to the federal government. 82 Rather than focus on the ex- 
tent of the federal government's power to implement, interpret and 
enforce international law, this Article questions why all three branches 
of the federal government take a minimalist approach in exercising 
this power, and suggests processes for encouraging greater inter- 
governmental cooperation. As regards the executive branch and Sen- 
ate, this minimalist approach suggests either lack of political will or 
the presence of other priorities that crowd out attention to treaty rati- 
fication and implementation. In the context of the federal judiciary, 
the reluctance to invoke or rely on international law may reflect ef- 
forts by the bench to position the judiciary strategically vis-a-vis other 
branches. 1 
Whatever the explanation, the state and local activity described in 
Part II suggests that subnational units of government are filling part of 
the vacuum created by the federal government's minimalist approach 
to human rights lawmaking. More than performing a gap-filling func- 
tion, this state and local activity is directed largely at fostering greater 
dialogue with and involvement by the federal government in human 
rights lawmaking. As discussed above, state and local initiatives in the 
While I am also intrigued by the ways in which concerns regarding separation 
of powers among the federal branches factor into this debate, these concerns are 
largely outside the scope of this Article. 
182 For an indication that the position advanced in this Article is consistent with 
(though not identical to) the traditional view, see discussion supra note 17 of Koh, su- 
pra note 10. 
See Benvenisti, supra note 48, at 173-75 (suggesting that judicial timidity is not 
motivated by a lack of courage or knowledge, but rather is result of deeper factors such 
as political advantage and opportunity to exert control over other branches of gov- 
ernment); see also Knop, suprra note 21, at 502 (disagreeing with the common view that 
"judges must still be educated, encouraged, and acculturated to apply international law 
properly"). 
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context of women's human rights and the death penalty signal coor- 
dinated efforts toward enlisting the federal government to implement, 
respectively, CEDAW and a death penalty moratorium. 
The process through which individuals and other actors demand 
that government (at whatever level) convert abstract principles into 
concrete law is captured by Cass Sunstein's observation that "[n]orm 
cascades occur when societies are presented with rapid shifts toward 
new norms." 184 This occurs "[w]hen the lowered cost of expressing 
new norms encourages an ever-increasing number of people to reject 
previously popular norms, to a 'tipping point' where it is adherence to 
the old norms that produces social disapproval." 8' As examples of 
norm cascades, Professor Sunstein cites "the attack on apartheid in 
South Africa, the fall of Communism, the election of Ronald Reagan, 
the rise of the feminist movement, and the current assault on affirma- 
tive acton.,18 
The concept of norm cascades is a useful one in analyzing the 
ways in which state and local adoption of human rights norms (either 
in binding laws or nonbinding resolutions) can lead to national ac- 
ceptance of these norms, reflected by policy change through federal 
legislation. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this phenomenon 
is the role that state and local anti-apartheid laws played in securing 
enactment of the federal Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 
1986.87 A more recent example is the role that state and local anti- 
Burma laws played in helping to pave the way for federal legislation 
on Burma.'88 Ironically, the Supreme Court found that the very fed- 
eral law that state and local governments encouraged Congress to pass 
preempted the Massachusetts state law.'8 9 However, Crosby leaves open 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIALJUSTICE 38 (1997). 
185Id. 
x?, Id. 
18 
7See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, ? 606, 100 
Stat. 1089, 1115-16 (1986) (providing states and localities with temporary discretion to 
enact anti-apartheid contract restrictions more secure than those promulgated by the 
federal government); see also Byron Rushing, Presentation on International Law and 
the Work of Federal and State Governments Panel, The American Society of Interna- 
tional Law (ASIL) Annual Meeting (Apr. 4-7, 2001) (transcript on file with author). 
See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
? 570, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-166-67 (1997) (allowing the President to impose sanctions 
against Burma by executive order until Burma improves its human rights practices and 
makes its government more democratic); see also Rushing, supra note 187, at 3-4 (stat- 
ing that Massachusetts passed the law "in order to put pressure on the federal govern- 
ment"). 
Rushing, supra note 187, at 5 ("[The Crosby opinion] said that we had been 
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the possibility of enactment of state and local initiatives that incorpo- 
rate human rights norms domestically, so long as these initiatives are 
not preempted by federal law.1 19 
In international relations theory, political scientists Martha Fin- 
nemore and Kathryn Sikkink describe a three-stage process through 
which a norm's influence in the international community can be un- 
derstood: (1) the emergence of the norm; (2) the broad acceptance 
of the norm (or norm cascade) following a "tipping point," at which 
"a critical mass of relevant [S]tate actors adopt the norm"; and (3) the 
internalization of the norm.'"' The internalization of international 
norms into domestic law involves both vertical and horizontal com- 
munication among transnational networks of various government ac- 
tors (including judges) as well as nongovernmental actors linked 
through technology, conferences, and other initiatives that facilitate 
globalization." 2 Harold Koh explains that this internalization process 
facilitates States' obedience to international law.'3 This Article sug- 
gests that dialogic federalism may be a vehicle for the cascading and 
internalization of norms. 
The dialogic approach to human rights lawmaking explored in 
this Article examines how international norms internalized at the 
subnational level can be transmitted back up to the national level for 
fuller translation of these norms into federal law. Of course, adoption 
of these norms at the federal level may then lead to preemption of the 
very state and local laws that paved the way for federal action-a di- 
preempted by the legislation that we of course helped to pass in the United States 
Congress.") . 
While Crosby leaves open the possibility of enactment of state and local laws that 
promote external policy initiatives as well, the Court held that the Massachusetts anti- 
Burma law was "an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress' full objectives under 
the Federal Act." Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). 
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 895 (1998). 
See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 96, at 3 (describing how activists, organized 
around a shared idea or cause, communicate transnationally to "promote norm im- 
plementation, by pressuring target actors to adopt new policies, and by monitoring 
compliance with international standards"); Slaughter, International Law, supra note 95, 
at 527-28 (discussing interactions among "the three domestic branches of government 
in each State transnationally with one another"). 
Koh, supra note 96, at 626 (explaining that nations obey international law "be- 
cause of a transnational legal process of interaction, interpretation, and internaliza- 
tion"); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 
2659 (1997) ("A transnational actor's moral obligation to obey an international norm 
becomes an internally binding domestic legal obligation when that norm has been in- 
terpreted and internalized into its domestic legal system."). 
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lemma that may or may not create disincentives for subfederal ac- 
tion. '94 Both case studies in Part III demonstrate how this two-way 
transmission is assisted by dynamic interactions between local, na- 
tional, and transnational advocacy networks that facilitate the transla- 
tion of international law into language that is more broadly accessible 
and relevant to the general public. ' By focusing on this dynamic 
process, this Article suggests that even the adoption of nonbinding 
norms (such as resolutions) at the state and local level can serve as a 
vehicle for the implementation of human rights.'l Dialogic federal- 
ism envisions formal structures constrained by constitutional law (i.e., 
hard law), through which both soft and hard law norm development 
are likely to occur at the state and local level in ways that are more 
visible, manageable, and intelligible. Along with other scholarship on 
international lawmaking within federal systems, 97 the dialogic ap- 
proach suggested here may also serve to suggest new ways in which 
domestic politics can intersect with international negotiations on hu- 
man rights."8 
The process of not only transmitting but also translating interna- 
tional law through networks of subnational government and nongov- 
ernment actors performs a dual function. First, as Sunstein's theory 
194 See Rushing, supra note 187, at 3-4 (noting this dilemma in the context of the 
federal law preempting the Massachusetts Burma law); supra note 189 and accompany- 
ing text (discussing the preemption of state law by federal law in the Crosby case). 
195 See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 96, at 1-3 (describing how transnational advo- 
cacy networks promote their policy agendas by framing those agendas to make them 
resonate for local audiences); see also Fung et al., supra note 100, at 2-3 (describing a 
system by which international firms would compete to be recognized as ethical em- 
ployers, thereby ratcheting up international labor standards). 
See Steve Ratner, Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?, 32 
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 591, 698 (2000) (citing the virtues of taking soft law into ac- 
count in analyzing norm development and suggesting that the "reluctance to incorpo- 
rate the element of softness into explanations of compliance" may relate to "an im- 
plicit assumption that hard law will affect behavior more than will soft law"); see also 
Chinkin, supra note 118, at 31-34 (discussing compliance with nonbinding norms). 
197 See, e.g., Bermann, supra note 101, at 59 (describing how subnational actors 
have consulted with their national governments regarding their views on proposed 
trade agreements); Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Comman- 
deering, in FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE U.S. AND 
THE E.U. (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 
1) (comparing Germany's and the United States' doctrines on commandeering), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstractjid=254147). 
198 See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games, 42 INT'L. ORG. 427, 434 (1988) (describing how international negotiators must 
play a two-level game by attempting to satisfy players at the national and international 
levels). 
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of norms cascades suggests, the process of translating human rights 
norms (even in nonbinding resolutions) by ever-increasing numbers 
of nonfederal government units pushes adoption of the norm to a 
"tipping point." At the tipping point, a relevant mass of actors rejects 
a previously popular norm or status quo and adheres to the new 
norm.'9 A second and equally important function that this norm- 
translation process performs is in increasing what Professor Daniel 
Halberstam calls the viscosity of international law. While Professor 
Louis Henkin is surely correct in famously observing that "[i]t is 
probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of in- 
ternational aw and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time,"'201 
nevertheless, " [t]here are many instances where a [S]tate is admittedly 
in violation" of international law.202 As Halberstam points out, "even 
deliberate and considered violations of international law continue to 
be a practical possibility."20' Because international law is a low-viscosity 
system, noncompliance occurs "without irreparably tearing the fabric 
of the governing legal orders," in contrast to a high-viscosity system 
(such as the U.S. constitutional law system) in which "the compliance 
pull preventing exit is quite high, and the costs of noncompliance are 
both certain and great.,204 Incorporating human rights norms into lo- 
9See SUNSTEIN, supra note 184, at 38 ("[T]he lowered cost of expressing new 
norms encourages an ever-increasing number of people to reject previously popular 
norms, to a 'tipping point' where it is adherence to the old norms that produces social 
disapproval."); see also Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 191, at 895 (describing how, at 
the "tipping point," a "critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm"). 
Halberstam, supra note 197 (manuscript at 10). Halberstam has also com- 
mented: 
Just as the 'viscosity' of a liquid reflects the forces of adhesion and friction that 
act on a body moving through the fluid substance, so too, the viscosity of a le- 
gal system may be viewed as a combination of the adhesive force of its norms, 
i.e. the compliance pull that its norms exert on legal actors, and the friction 
caused by non-compliant action, i.e. the real costs that actors incur by non- 
compliance. 
Id. (manuscript at 10) (relying on THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY 
AMONG NATIONS 26 (1990), in which Franck developed the concept of "compliance 
pull"; and Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 
IND. L.J. 1397, 1400 (1997), in which Koh discusses the elements of compliance, 
namely, the awareness and acceptance of a rule for external, instrumental reasons). 
Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979); see also Koh, supra 
note 193, at 2599 (noting that empirical surveys have borne out this statement). 
HENKIN, supra note 201, at 43; see also id. at 68-87 (discussing reasons for the 
persistence of violations). 
203 Halberstam, supra note 197 (manuscript at 12). 
204 Id. (manuscript at 11) (relying on ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND 
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970)); see 
also GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. RocKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION? DOMESTIC 
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cal law, state and local initiatives-particularly those that are legally 
binding-may increase the viscosity of human rights law in the United 
States.20 
In performing these two important functions, state and local ini- 
tiatives incorporating human rights standards may facilitate legally en- 
forceable commitments at the national level. Far from adopting the 
revisionist perspective that states should displace the federal govern- 
ment in implementing, interpreting and enforcing international law, 
however, this Article argues that the federal government should play a 
strong leadership role in coordinating information regarding state 
and local efforts to publicize best practices, to distill lessons learned, 
and to extract workable norms for possible adoption at the national 
level. Moreover, this Article stops short of endorsing more ambitious 
proposals to involve state and local governments directly in the treaty- 
20(6 making process. While recognizing that subnational government 
units have participated on a limited basis in the World Trade Organi- 
zation (WTO),-27 in trade negotiations 208 and in various international 
UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 77 (1995) (noting that 
(GATT "establish [es] sanctions for noncompliance that are low enough to allow politi- 
cians to break the agreement when interest group benefits are great, but high enough 
to encourage states to obey the agreement most of the time and thereby prevent trade 
wars"); Benvenisti, supra note 92, at 196 (discussing "the opportunities for govern- 
ments and small groups to evade specific [treaty] clauses with impunity"). 
- Note that the bindingness of state and local initiatives incorporating human 
rights norms matters more in performing the viscosity-strengthening function than it 
does in performing the tipping-point function. Here, we may consider Halberstam's 
helpful observation that 
[t]he viscosity of a legal system is thus related to, but different from, the char- 
acteristics of "hardness" or "softness" of legal rules, which refer principally to 
the degree to which legal rules are binding as a normative matter as opposed 
to the degree to which they are observed as a practical matter. 
Halberstam, sulra note 197 (manuscript at 1 n.42) (citing C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge 
of Sqo/ Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT'L & C(OMP. L.Q. 850, 
851 (1989), which describes hard laws as those that "specify the exact obligations un- 
dertaken or the rights granted" and soft laws as those that provide only for "the grad- 
uial acquiring of standards or for general goals"). 
2See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 17, at 569 ("I also propose that subnational entities be 
afforded some mechanism to discretely [sic] associate with formal human rights re- 
gimes."). 
- Id. at 592-93. Spiro describes the plurilateral Agreement on Government Pro- 
curement's opt-in model, in which a "sub-central" government has the option of ac- 
cepting the treaty regime by notifying the WTO through the relevant central govern- 
ment. Id. at 592. Central governments remain the only formal parties to the 
agreement, and are responsible for the violations by subnational governments but only 
with regard to those "whose acceptance has been notified." Id. As of November 1997, 
Spiro notes that "[t]hirty-seven states ha[d] indicated their assent to the treaty terms to 
the office of the U.S. Trade Representative, which in turn ha[d] transmitted accep- 
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environmental conferences, examination of state and local govern- 
ment involvement in such external international arenas is beyond the 
scope of this Article.210 As for internal domestic incorporation of hu- 
man rights law, however, a stronger coordination role by the national 
government is needed because "the Constitution created the institu- 
tions of the federal government precisely to avoid such balkanization 
of foreign policy and international affairs.",21' An Inter-Agency Work- 
ing Group (along the lines of theme established under Executive Or- 
der 13,107) could play such a coordination role. 
Ultimately, it is in the federal government's national interest to 
become more involved in monitoring and nurturing these local ef- 
forts. Under international law, the federal government is responsible 
for treaty violations of subnational governments and their officials.212 
Even assuming international law eventually establishes liability for 
subnational governments,213 national governments will likely continue 
tance to the WTO secretariat." Id. at 592-93. Significantly, Spiro points out that the 
"Massachusetts state law restricting procurement from corporations doing business in 
Burma ... [became] the subject of a WTO complaint [asserted] by the European Un- 
ion andJapan ... [and that it did] not appear to have resulted in the equivalent of de- 
accession by subfederal governments." Id. at 593. 
208 See Bermann, supra note 101, at 59 (discussing states' roles in consulting with 
the United States regarding trade agreements). 
2' See Spiro, supra note 17, at 594-95 (discussing involvement of subnational gov- 
ernments at the 1992 Rio Conference on the Environment as well as at the more re- 
cent Habitat II Summit in Istanbul). 
For comparative investigations of the practice of other European countries and 
notably Germany, whose subnational governments participate in the European Union, 
see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Committee on the Regions and the Role of Regional Governments 
in the European Union, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 413, 423-30 (1997), compar- 
ing Germany's, Belgium's, and Austria's national arrangements that permit subna- 
tional input into decisions on European-level issues; Halberstam, supra note 197 
(manuscript at 19-31), comparing Germany, the United States, and the European Un- 
ion; Tushnet, supra note 38, at 1065-71, describing constitutional federalism in the 
United States; and Juliane Kokott, Federal States in Federal Europe: The Geman Ldinder 
and Problems of European Integration, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS IN THE ERA OF 
INTEGRATION 175, 176 (AnteroJyrinki ed., 1999), discussing "the interaction between 
EU-level federalism and German federalism." 
211 Koh, supra note 10, at 1841. 
212 Bermann, supra note 101, at 60. 
21 Going a step further than I am prepared to go in this Article, Professor Spiro 
has called for the establishment of "condominium" responsibility, "under which both a 
central government and its political subdivisions would be held legally accountable," 
an approach that would be "similar to joint and several liability under tort law." Spiro, 
supra note 17, at 588-89. Establishment of such liability may be consistent with other 
recent developments in international law establishing criminal responsibility for indi- 
viduals accused of war crimes. See, eg., Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court Statute, June 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1002. Joint and several liability for subna- 
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to be on the hook so long as these governments continue to assert 
control over their constituent units. 
At the same time, by cultivating the ability of state and local initia- 
tives to serve as a vector for incorporation of human rights law, the 
U.S. government could develop a broader and deeper commitment to 
human rights. By theorizing new modes of democratic deliberation, 
dialogic federalism could enable the federal government to deepen its 
partnerships with subnational governments, through engagement in 
dialogue and collaboration, which these state and local initiatives in- 
vite. 
tional and national governments might also be consistent with recent cases concerning 
civil liability for corporations responsible for human rights violations. See) e.g., Wiwa v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 108 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing dismissal of suit 
for forum non conveniens), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1402 (2001); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 
142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting Texaco's motion to dismiss for fo- 
rum non conveniens); Doe v. UNOCAL Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1312 (C.D. Cal 
2000) (granting UNOCAL summary judgment on plaintiff's Alien Tort Claims Act and 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act claims and dismissing plaintiff's 
state law claims without prejudice), affid, 248 F.3d 915, 931 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming 
dismissal of defendant French corporation for lack of personal jurisdiction). 
